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GERRY-BUILT VOTING RIGHTS:
THE DISTRICT SHAPE TEST
INTRODUCTION
Although voting is the essence of democracy,' minority
voters have found that casting ballots is no guarantee of political participation.2 The combination of polarized voting, majority rule, and manipulable electoral mechanisms, particularly the
drawing of districts, can slant an election decisively in the
majority's favor. Under unchecked majority rule, a permanent
majority bloc can routinely silence the votes of the minority.
This effect, called "vote dilution," reflects the diminution or
cancellation of the minority vote.3
The Fifteenth Amendment' and its well-known progeny,
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("Act"), 5 prohibit denial or dilution of the right to vote on account of race. However, preventing
such dilution is more easily said than done. Vote dilution
remedies that take race into account are controversial. Advocates of a "colorblind" Constitution charge that race-conscious

1

As Chief Justice Warren wrote, "[tihe right to vote freely for the candi-

date of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government."
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). The Court framed the right to
vote as a super-fundamental right, "preservative of all rights." Id. at 562
(quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
2
The term "minority" here denotes "discrete and insular" groups sharing
a common characteristic such as race. The courts have a special obligation to
provide such groups protection against the oppression or indifference of the
majority. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938). See also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75-104 (1980)
(describing the broader "representation-reinforcing" theory that courts should
protect the rights of politically disfavored minorities against majority abuses).
s As the Court explained, "the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
562 (1964).
4 The Fifteenth Amendment provides: "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
5

Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988)). See discussion infra
parts II.B.2, llI.C.1.

273

274 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol.4:273
measures, particularly "safe districting,"6 represent impermissible affirmative action, or reverse discrimination, beyond the
Congressionally intended or constitutionally permitted scope of
the Act.
In a sharply divided decision, the Supreme Court recently
joined the attack on safe districting. Splitting 5-4 in Shaw v.
Reno,' the Court created a new cause of action that permits
plaintiffs to challenge irregularly-shaped safe districts as violations of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.' The
Court held that some districting plans may be sufficiently
"bizarre" as to be "unexplainable on grounds other than race."9
If a plaintiff makes a showing of irregularity, "racial gerrymandering"'" is presumed; if the state cannot rebut that presumption, it bears the burden of defending the districting under strict
scrutiny, the Court's most exacting standard of review."
The Shaw decision stands ominously at the intersection of
voting rights and race-conscious remedial legislation. Although
the Court expressly did not decide whether all race-conscious
districting might be unconstitutional, it vigorously denounced
the potential harms of race-consciousness used for any purpose,
including remedies." Such language has become a characteristic refrain of the increasingly conservative Court, and Shaw
must therefore be taken for what it is: a preliminary attack on
the inherent race consciousness of the Voting Rights Act.
This Note argues that the Shaw Court misinterpreted the
facts of the case, misconstrued the substance of voting rights,

6 A safe district is a district that sends a single representative to a
legislative body and that is drawn race-consciously to create a districtwide
majority of a statewide minority. In a safe district, the majoritarian tables are
turned: the "majority-minority" can vote and win at majority rule. Safe
districts are currently the most common judicial remedy for dilution of minority voting rights. See discussion infra part I.C.4.
7 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
' The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "No

State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
9 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
10 "Gerrymandering" is the self-interested manipulation of district lines to
benefit a group in power, and commonly, though inaccurately, connotes using
strange-shape districts to do so. See discussion infra part I.B.
1' Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832.
12
See discussion infra part III.A.2.

1994]

THE DISTRICT SHAPE TEST

275

and created a regressive cause of action. The shape-based
claim," evidently turning on aesthetic and formal considerations, mysteriously divorces the concept of gerrymandering
from proof of harm to anyone. The result is a major setback for
voting rights that should be judicially or legislatively derailed.
Part I clarifies the foundations of Shaw, including the
issues underlying minority voting rights, the significance of
districting, and the inherent problems of judicial oversight of
the political process. Establishing appropriate standards of
review has proved to be one of the judiciary's most difficult
tasks, and the Court, to the detriment of minorities, has not
articulated a coherent theory of political fairness to support it.
This Part notes the case law on which the Shaw shape test
relies and discusses the lessons of thirty years ofjudicial experience with the familiar but limited rule of one person, one vote.
Part II summarizes the Shaw facts and opinions. Part III
examines the flawed premises of the shape test and its failure
to articulate the harm it is meant to remedy. This Note concludes that the Court made a serious departure from precedent
with this new extension of formal race analysis and that the
shape test must be discarded if voting rights reform is to survive. In the event the Court instead ratifies or broadens its
reasoning in Shaw, this Note briefly discusses ways to limit the
doctrine's impact and to protect the Voting Rights Act, including
alternatives to safe districting that may allay equal protection
concerns, moot Shaw, and salvage some of the vigor of voting
rights reform.
I. FOUNDATIONS
A. THE RIGHT OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Voting rights begin with the individual vote. However, in
our representative, as opposed to direct, democracy, there are
three stages through which one must pass to realize meaningful
political participation: first, the ability to cast a vote; second,
" Technically, the Shaw test applies to any "bizarre" districting plan and
not to strange-shape districts per se. However, the Court's discussion of
relevant factors to consider in evaluating a plan, such as district compactness,
contiguity and preservation of political subdivisions, are essentially shape
considerations, and it is apparent that the "bizarre" districting the Court had
in mind were the strange-shape districts of the classic gerrymander and the
case before it. See discussion infra part III.A.2.
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the ability to elect a candidate of one's choice; and third, the
ability to influence legislative decisions. 4 Early voting rights
reform focused on the first stage by increasing voter registration
and ensuring access to the ballot: striking down poll taxes,
literacy tests, and other discriminatory practices. More recently, safe districting has been used to surmount the second stage
by creating pockets of sufficiently concentrated minority political
power to elect minority-chosen candidates. 5
1. The Vulnerability of Minority PoliticalRights
Before ratification of the Constitution, James Madison cautioned in The FederalistPapersthat minority rights are inadequately protected by pure majority rule: "If a majority be
united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be
insecure."'" He reasoned that it was equally important for "a
republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of
its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the
injustice of the other part."'7
For this simple reason, majority rule is sometimes subject
to abuse. Under "winner-take-all" majority rule, fifty percentplus-one of the voters can be mathematically certain to control
100% of the power, regardless of the votes of the minority. 8 If

14

See Richard C. Reuben, Challengesto Race-Based DistrictsCould Shatter

Minority Electoral Gains, CAL. LAW., Nov. 1993, at 39 (reporting remarks of
Professor Guinier).
15 The third tier of meaningful participation, legislative decisionmaking by
minority representatives, is no less important than the first and second tiers.
See generally Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political
Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413 (1991) (discussing problems of legislative
empowerment). However, this author leaves its discussion for another day.
16 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Willmoore Kendall &
George W. Carey eds., 1966). However, majority rule is not the only possible
rule for democracy; it is merely a convenient compromise between achieving
consensus and efficiency. One could imagine, for example, a legislature run on
a rule of unanimity. Although this also constitutes "democratic" rule, it would
give veto power to even the smallest and most self-interested groups and thus
would be incompatible with the goal of effective government.
1

7 Id.

" According to public choice theory, even small "interest groups" with, for
example, significant economic clout can exert considerable control over
legislative processes, even overriding the will of the majority. See Jonathan R.
Macey, PromotingPublic-RegardingLegislationThrough StatutoryInterpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986) (arguing that
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the majority establishes a stable voting bloc or faction,19 it has
no need to negotiate with the minority for votes. Such a bloc
majority owes nothing in political capital to the minority, yet it
gains inflated political power in the legislature because it is
apportioned power as if it spoke for both the majority and the
minority.
Once a majority faction obtains legislative power, it can enlarge and entrench that power by influencing voting mechanisms and practices. For example, majority-controlled drafting
of electoral district boundaries can guarantee the seats of
"majority incumbents and expand majority political control over
additional districts. Although this appears to be ordinary
politics, in which factionalization is a permanent feature of the
political landscape,20 such politics preserve undemocratic
majority domination in a way that was precisely Madison's
concern. 21 Because of deeply racially polarized voting, AfricanAmerican voters have felt these effects for many years.22
Madison argued that the tendency of the majority to selfdeal was immutable and that the political system had to be
statutes should be interpreted narrowly to diminish the power of private
interest groups). This again shows that unmodified majority rule does not
guarantee fairness.
19 "Faction" is used here as Madison defined it: "a number of citizens,
whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and
actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interests, adverse to the
rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Willmoore
Kendall & George W. Carey eds., 1966).
20 There are constitutional limits to extremely discriminatory politics; the
Supreme Court held that a justiciable question is presented where "purely
political" gerrymandering is so extreme as to violate the most basic guarantees
of the Equal Protection Clause. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118-27
(1986).
21 See Frank I. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional
and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REV. 275, 315 (1972) ("Race prejudice
divides groups that have much in common (blacks and poor whites) and unites
groups (whites, rich and poor) that have little else in common than their
antagonism for the racial minority. Race prejudice, in short, provides the
'majority of the whole' with that 'common motive to invade the rights of other
citizens' that Madison believed improbable in a pluralistic society.").
' The continuing political, economic and social disadvantages of people of
color have been well documented. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE
BOTroM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992); T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Significance of
Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 325, 355-64 (1992).
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designed to control it: "[Tihe causes of faction cannot be removed and... relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects. '2 3 For the then-nascent federal government,
he urged that such countermajoritarian means could be built
into the structure of federalist democracy.'
Racially polarized voting provides contemporary evidence of
the persistence and power of factionalism.' After the enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, racism continued to
effectively suppress African-American votes. The courts provided little recourse; voting rights suits were difficult to bring and
harder to win, requiring as many as 6,000 hours of reviewing
registration records to prepare for trial." Voting qualification
tests were administered discriminatorily, all-white primaries
existed for many years, and vague "good morals" tests granted
As of the
voting officials broad discretion to disenfranchise.'
mid-1960s, African-American registration in Alabama reached
only 19.4%; in Louisiana, 31.8%; and in Mississippi, 6.4%. Yet
white registration ran fifty percent or more ahead.' In North
Carolina, African-Americans scored lower on literacy tests
because they received inferior educations in segregated
schools,2 9 and public restaurants and accommodations were
inaccessible,"° let alone the ballot box.
As the civil rights movement expanded the right of AfricanAmericans to vote, the majority's tactics shifted from obstruction
to dilution of the minority vote. In 1986 a key voting rights
case, Thornburg v. Gingles,3" provided a snapshot of the effects
of discrimination in North Carolina. The Gingles Court relied
on the district court's findings that from 1900 to 1970 "North
Carolina had officially discriminated against its black citizens
with respect to their exercise of the voting franchise," using poll
' THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 19, at 80.
2

Id. at 80-84.

' See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the PoliticalProcess: The
Transformationof Voting Rights Jurisprudence,90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 186061 (1992) (evaluating Madison's concerns in light of modern problems of
polarized voting and minority vote dilution).
26 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 314 (1966).
2

1Id. at 310-13.

28 Id. at 313.

30

See Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 293-95 (1969).
See Blow v. North Carolina, 379 U.S. 684 (1965).

31

478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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taxes, literacy tests, and other methods.32 After these direct
restraints were eliminated, North Carolina persisted with statesanctioned discrimination to depress African-American voter
registration.33 Meanwhile, "historic discrimination in education, housing, employment, and health services" lowered African-American socioeconomic status and political power, and
"white candidates in North Carolina... encouraged
voting
3
along color lines by appealing to racial prejudice." '
Although over one-fifth of North Carolina's population is
African-American, discriminatory electoral practices and "severe
and persistent racially polarized voting"35 have kept most
African-Americans out of office. 6 Not one African-American
was elected to the United States Congress from North Carolina
for nearly one hundred years. Yet in 1992, North Carolina sent
two African-Americans to the House of Representatives, primarily with African-American support and as a direct result of
redistricting under the auspices of the Voting Rights Act.3"
This redistricting was also the focus of the challenge brought in
Shaw v. Reno.3"
2. Voting Rights Reform
The Voting Rights Act, enacted "to banish the blight of
racial discrimination in voting,"3 9 enabled minority groups to

32

3

1d. at 38 (citing findings of trial court).

Id.

34Id. at 39-41.
3 Id. at 41.
3
The general inability of African-American candidates to win office stems
from two discriminatory factors: the refusal of white voters to vote for
someone who is African-American, and their refusal to vote for someone
predominately supported by African-Americans. The paucity of AfricanAmerican representatives in Congress is thus related to, but is not the same
as, the problem of minority disenfranchisement. See infra parts I.C.4 and
IH.B.2 (discussing voting discrimination remedies).
" Eva M. Clayton and Melvin L. Watt were the first African-American
North Carolinians elected to Congress since 1898. BRUCE A. RAGSDALE &
JOEL D. TREESE, BLACK AMERICANS IN CONGRESS, 1870-1989 (1990); The 1992

Elections: State by State: South, N.Y. TImEs, Nov. 4, 1992, at B18.
113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
8 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (upholding
constitutionality of Voting Rights Act).
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exercise some of their political rights for the first time.4' The
Act benefits victims of discrimination in two ways. First, it
provides minority plaintiffs with statutory grounds on which to
challenge electoral schemes as dilutive, and second, it requires
the most racially polarized states to obtain permission from the
federal government before making electoral changes that might
be discriminatory.4 These protections are contained in two
key sections of the Act, Sections 2 and 5.42
Section 2 is remedial and establishes a cause of action to
enjoin electoral practices where the "totality of the circumstances" indicates invidious interference with minority political
opportunity.'
Although a court may consider the extent to
which minority members have or have not been elected to office,
Section 2 expressly does not create a right to proportional
representation."4
Section 5 is narrower and prophylactic; it only applies to
"covered jurisdictions," counties with a history of discriminatory
practices. 5 This section requires these jurisdictions to receive
federal approval before making even subtle electoral changes."
A change will not be approved if it limits the accessibility of the
political process to a protected class or if it violates the
"nonretrogression" principle, which requires that changes not
place the electoral strength of a protected minority in worse
standing than it was before the changes. 7 Approval is ob40

See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain, Voting Rights and Democratic Theory: Toward

a Color-Blind Society?, in

CONTROvERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING

RIGHTS AcT IN PERSPECTWVE 261 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds.,
1992).
41 See McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1984).
42

42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988) (Section 2); 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988) (Section 5).

4'42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
4442 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988) ([N]othing in this section establishes a right
to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their
proportion in the population.").
4'The Act defines a "covered jurisdiction" as a state or political subdivision
that, as of November 1964, 1968 or 1972, imposed a literary test, poll tax,
requirement of "good moral character" or similar restriction on voter registration, and in which fewer than 50% of eligible voters were registered or had
voted in the Presidential election of the respective year. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b)
(1988); see also 28 C.F.R. Part 51, app. (1994) (list of covered jurisdictions as
determined by the Attorney General, including 40 counties in North Carolina).
46 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
4'Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
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tained either by declaratory judgment or, more commonly, by
seeking the Attorney General's preclearance."
The Act provides an important deterrent effect on legislative decisionmaking. It is a "brooding omnipresence"4 9 that
gives minority voting rights primary importance in district
planning, particularly in covered jurisdictions subject to both
Section 5 preclearance and Section 2 vote dilution suits.50 The
Act has been so important in this mission, and some of the
states so recalcitrant, that in 1982 Congress strengthened and
renewed the Act through the year 2007. 5 '
The effectiveness of the Act depends heavily on the
judiciary's construction of its language and mandate. For
instance, in Presley v. Etowah County Commission,5 2 the Supreme Court construed the statute narrowly. In that case, the
Justice Department imposed electoral changes pursuant to the
Act on the system of electing commissioners to two commissions
in Alabama."3 These changes resulted in the election of three
African-Americans to the county commission for the first time in
recent history." However, the incumbent white commissioners, still in the majority, voted to all but eliminate the power
allocated to the newcomers.55

4

' Id. The option to seek preclearance from the Attorney General was
added to the Act to provide covered jurisdictions expedited review of electoral
changes. See McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 246 (1984). Regardless of
whether the covered jurisdiction opts for a declaratory judgment (in the District Court for the District of Columbia) or preclearance, it carries the burden
of proving that the proposed plan imposes no discriminatory or retrogressive
effect. Id. at 247. Because preclearance is more convenient and less expensive, it is the overwhelmingly preferred route. The judiciary also accords
substantial deference to the Attorney General's interpretations of the Act.
NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 178-79 (1985).
49
See Bernard Grofinan, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He
Had Said: 'When It Comes to Redistricting,Race Isn't Everything, It's the
Only Thing"?, 14 CARDOzO L. REv. 1237, 1263-65 (1993) (describing Act as
"brooding omnipresence").
50
Id. at 1239 ("Section 5 preclearance provisions will have a strong
deterrent effect on plans that give even the appearance of being dilutive, since
the jurisdiction must bear the costs of contesting a preclearance denial.").
51
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 1 (1982).
52 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992).

Id. at 825-27.
54 Id. at 832.
3

0 Id. at 825-26.
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Despite the discriminatory effect of these actions, the Court
refused to intervene, construing the Act as limited to "changes
'with respect to voting,"' and not "changes 'with respect to governance."'5 6 The Court explained that "the Voting Rights Act is
not an all-purpose antidiscrimination statute [and does not]
apply to other forms of pernicious discrimination."5 Regardless of the accuracy or inaccuracy of this interpretation, Presley
shows that the formal right to vote is no guarantee of political
participation. 58 The substance of voting, that is, the prospect
of exercising influence over an actual outcome of the political
process, is the principle the white Alabama commissioners
easily defeated. Majority rule, standing alone, is not enough to
ensure legitimate rule.
B. THE ROLE OF DISTRICTING
Districting is the mechanical process of dividing territories
into districts, and most elections are conducted under some
districting scheme. In its simplest form, an election may be atlarge, with all voters in an undivided political unit voting to fill
all of the representative seats available. For example, the vote
for United States senators occurs in an at-large election with
respect to state boundaries. More commonly, territories are
divided into districts. Voters in a "single-member" district vote
exclusively to fill one seat, whereas voters in a "multimember"
district vote for several, but not all, of the seats in a single
legislative body.
The method of districting can have, and is usually intended
to have, significant political effects.59
Truly "neutral"

56 Id.

at 832.

See also Robert B. Carter, Note, Mere Voting:

Pres-

ley v. Etowah County Commission and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
71 N.C. L. REV. 569 (1993) (discussing weakening effects of Presley on § 5
jurisprudence).
57 Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 832.
5 See also Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) (finding § 2 inapplicable
to number of seats in commission governing body).
9 In Davis v. Bandemer, Justice White explained:
The very essence of districting is to produce a different - a more
'politically fair' - result than would be reached with elections at
large, in which the winning party would take 100% of the legislative
seats. Politics and political considerations are inseparable from
districting and apportionment.... The reality is that districting
inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political consequences.

1994]

THE DISTRICT SHAPE TEST

283

districting is unattainable because it is undefinable. Any linedrawing will have political effects of some kind, and the combination of effects that strikes a neutral balance depends on the
perspective and politics of the observer.6" For example, in
Shaw v. Reno,"' the Justice Department imposed its view that
the inclusion of two safe districts restored fairness and neutrality, while the plaintiffs preferred a plan resulting from ordinary
political processes.
Gerrymandering is the deliberate manipulation of
districting to benefit a particular interest. It is often used by
the political party that controls the state legislature and enacts
the districting plan to dilute the votes of its opposition, sometimes on the basis of race.62 Discriminatory districting may be
accomplished by "splitting" opposition voters among as many
districts as possible or by "packing" them in as few as possible." The split group will be outvoted in all the districts and
the packed group will "waste" its votes in the districts where it
is excessively concentrated, losing control or influence it could
have had over other districts.' Districts drawn with or without regard to the constituencies of incumbents may, for example, determine who gets reelected.
Shape is a district's most readily apparent characteristic,
and strange shape inheres in the popular conception of gerry478 U.S. 109, 128-29 (1986). On the positive side, single-member districting
can serve important and legitimate state goals, such as ensuring better local
representation, balancing urban and rural interests, and remedying minority
exclusion via safe districting. Federal law mandates single-member districts
for Congressional representatives. 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1988).
e' As the Court noted twenty years ago, "[d]istrict lines are rarely neutral
phenomena." Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973). Professor
Dixon argued that "every line drawn wittingly or unwittingly will have an
apportionment political effect different from another line which is equally
'equal' and equally available." ROBERT G. DixoN, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 380 (1968).

113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
62 As the Court recently noted, "[iun the context of single-member districts,
the usual device for diluting minority voting power is the manipulation of
district lines." Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1155 (1993).
63Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2840.
" The principle of wasting opponent votes is not confined to the single61

member district. An at-large voting scheme, with no districts at all, may be
the optimal weapon of discrimination in certain circumstances, permitting a
united majority to assume control of the entire political unit. The

multimember district shares characteristics of both methods.
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mandering. Indeed, the term was coined in 1812 to ridicule the
reptilian shape of Massachusetts
Governor Elbridge Gerry's
"salamander" district.6 5 Modern dictionary definitions of gerrymandering also typically emphasize strange shape, tending to
equate it with discrimination."
Pundits frequently depict
contorted districts as silent indictments of the lack of integrity
of the political process.6"
However, strange district shape is not a reliable test of
illegitimate motives. The late Professor Dixon objected to the
popular emphasis on shape as "highly unfortunate" because "[i]t
immediately casts attention in the wrong direction - towards
superficialities of shape and size, rather than towards the
political realities of district composition."6
He argued that
"[glerrymandering is simply discriminatory districting which
operates unfairly to inflate the
political strength of one group
69
another.
of
that
deflate
and
The shape connotation of gerrymandering misleads where,
for example, a voting bloc is geographically concentrated and
can be easily isolated by an ordinary-looking district. A square
district drawn around an inner city might capture virtually all
the voters in a particular group, removing their influence from
all other districts. Because the political effect of drawing
districts depends intimately on the geographical distribution of
voters of various alignments, manipulation takes many geometric forms, regular or irregular, in accordance with demographics

See DIXON, supra note 58 at 459.
One authoritative definition of gerrymander is "to divide a territorial
unit into election districts in an unnatural and unfair way with the purpose of
giving one political party an electoral majority in a large number of districts
while concentrating the voting strength of the opposition in as few districts as

possible."

WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIoNARY

952 (1986). A

legal dictionary defines gerrymandering in stronger terms as districting with
an "ulterior or unlawful purpose" of partisan results differing from districting
achieved "according to obvious natural lines." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 618
(5th ed. 1979). Note each dictionary's emphasis on "unnatural or unfair" and
"obvious natural lines," terms whose definitions are themselves subjective.
67
See, e.g., GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION: CONGRESS, TERM LIMTs, AND
THE RECOVERY OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

43-46 (1992) (using maps to

depict supposed districting abuses, including part of the plan challenged in
Shaw).

' DIXON, supra note 58, at 459.
69 ROBERT G. DIXON, THE COURT, THE PEOPLE, AND "ONE MAN, ONE VOTE"
in

REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970s

29 (Nelson W. Polsby ed., 1971).
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that are accidents of history or, more commonly, characteristics
of particular groups.

Given the difficulty of identifying districting abuses, some
commentators have suggested abolishing districting altogether.
However, where voting is racially polarized, this approach would
only place political control squarely in the hands of the majority.
In the resulting at-large election, the minority would have no
way to counter majority discrimination because it would be
unable to elect even a single legislator. ° Abolishing districting
would spread majority domination in individual districts to the
state as a whole because it would merely transform the state
into one large district. 1
C. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DISTRICTING

The judiciary maintains a central role in voting rights
reform because it interprets and enforces the requirements of
the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. As judicial intervention in electoral processes has increased, the courts have
wrestled with defining this role. Political apportionment,
classically characterized by Justice Frankfurter as a perilous

7

oSee Barbara L. Berry & Thomas R. Dye, The DiscriminatoryEffects of
At-Large Elections, 7 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 85, 87 (1979) (in discriminatory atlarge elections, "t]he minority's loss is absolute"). The rise in popularity of
initiatives, referenda and other forms of "direct democracy" that not only
dispense with districting, but also the moderating deliberation of elected
representatives, raises even more troubling concerns of unchecked majority
rule and the submergence of the voice of minority groups. See Cain, supra
note 40, at 273-75 (describing the potentially deleterious effect on minorities
of trend towards "new populism"); see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17-18
(1978) ("Direct legislation, the creation of progressives of another era, today
poses more danger to social progress than the problems of governmental
unresponsiveness it was intended to cure.").
1Nor would arbitrary, random districting be fair, because it would not
upset the majority's natural advantage. A district with a majority of a
geographically diffuse minority would be unlikely to result from happenstance.
Random lines would also disserve the secondary districting goals emphasized
by Shaw of compactness, contiguity and preservation of political subdivisions.
See discussion infra part I.C.3.
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"political thicket,"72 provides few clear standards of review or
self-evident remedies.
1. Entering the "PoliticalThicket"
Shaw represents the most recent attempt in the Court's
thirty-year effort to define the judiciary's role in the political
thicket. The search began with the Court's milestone 1962
decision Baker v. Carr,7 which addressed a challenge of the
Tennessee apportionment of state legislative districts. From
1901 to 1961, the Tennessee urban population grew dramatically, yet the Tennessee legislature, dominated by thinly-populated
rural interests, refused to disturb the 1901 apportionment. The
plaintiffs charged that the apportionment was "arbitrary and
capricious," irrationally favoring some counties over others.74
For the first time, the Court held that such a claim presented a
justiciable equal protection claim and that the federal courts
properly had subject matter jurisdiction.7 5
Justice Frankfurter dissented energetically, stating that "[a]
hypothetical claim resting on abstract assumptions is now for
the first time made the basis for affording illusory relief for a
particular evil even though it foreshadows deeper and more
pervasive difficulties in consequence. '"76 He protested at length
the Court's foray into the political realm, arguing that it would
undermine the integrity of the judiciary by immersing the
courts in a quintessential political question.77 Justice Frankfurter warned that establishing judicial standards would burden
the courts with the insurmountable "task of accommodating the

72 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).

Justice Frankfurter

strongly resisted judicial intervention in the districting process, arguing that
the "remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that
will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress." Id. "The
Constitution," he wrote, "has left the performance of many duties in our
governmental scheme to depend on the fidelity of the executive and legislative
action and, ultimately, on the vigilance of the people in exercising their
political rights." Id.
73 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
74
Id. at 207.
75

Id. at 204.

76

Id. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 280-97.

77
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incommensurable factors of policy that underlie these mathematical puzzles. '78
Justice Frankfurter correctly surmised that Baker would be
difficult to apply. Although Baker opened the door to judicial
review, it was conspicuously silent as to the standards and
remedies to be used.79 In 1964 the Court turned to the simple
and restrained rule of "one person, one vote," reasoning that "as
nearly as is practicable one man's vote.., is to be worth as
much as another's."8
The one person, one vote rule promised
mathematical application and limited judicial involvement in
the details of the political process, apparently avoiding the
"incommensurable factors of policy" that concerned Justice
Frankfurter. 1 But the following year, the Voting Rights Act
thrust the federal judiciary firmly into the political thicket by
outlawing a variety of directly and indirectly discriminatory
electoral practices, including discriminatory districting.
The Warren Court initially construed the Act broadly. 2
However, the Burger Court later sought to limit its scope in
accordance with a more conservative view of civil rights remedies and the propriety of judicial intervention. In 1980 the
Voting Rights Act reached a crossroads with the Court's decision
in City of Mobile v. Bolden. 3 In Bolden, the Court upheld an
at-large voting scheme against a Section 2 charge of vote dilution. The plurality opinion -first read Section 2 as legislative
surplusage that added nothing to the protections of the Fif-

7

Id.at 268.

7 As Chief Justice Warren later described Baker: "We intimated no view
as to the proper constitutional standards for evaluating the validity of a state
legislative apportionment scheme. Nor did we give any consideration to the
question of appropriate remedies." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,556 (1964).
See also Robert B. McKay, PoliticalThickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MIcH. L. REv. 645, 649 (1963) (discussing
Baker's deliberate ambiguities shortly after its decision).
' Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). See discussion infra part
I.C.2 (discussing one person, one vote rule). Although the Court initially wrote
"one man, one vote," it later remembered the Nineteenth Amendment and
switched to "one person, one vote."
" But see infra part I.C.2 (arguing that one person, one vote's neutrality is

illusory).
82 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966) (upholding

constitutionality of Voting Rights Act).
m 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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teenth Amendment.' The Court then reasoned that because
"racially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of
a Fifteenth Amendment violation," the Bolden plaintiffs could
show no injury - they had proven only discriminatory effect,
not intent, in the city's maintenance of an at-large system.8 5
The Court found that the ability of African-American voters to
"register and vote without hindrance" was enough to satisfy the
Constitution.8 6
The Court's choice of an intent-based formal standard
reflects the process orientation of its conservative members and
highlights a doctrinal viewpoint that later informed Shaw.8 7
To focus on the intent of the districting officials is to assume
that a districting plan created without proven racial intent,
regardless of its effect, is nondiscriminatory, at least for constitutional purposes. Thus, so long as minority voters are able to
execute their formal right to vote, it is irrelevant that their substantive constitutional right to participate means nothing unless
it is shown that someone intends for their right to mean noth88
ing.
The Court's rigidly formal Bolden analysis departed from
the Voting Rights Act's substantive purpose of ensuring equal
opportunity to participate in the political process. As a practical
matter, requiring proof of racial animus imposed a heavy burden on plaintiffs; the viability of Section 2 litigation appeared to
be on the verge of collapse.89 In 1982 Congress rebuffed the
' Id. at 60-61 ("ITihe sparse legislative history of § 2 makes clear that it
was intended to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself.").

' Id. at 62. The requirement of racially discriminatory intent extended to
voting rights the philosophy behind the Court's rulings in several contemporaneous discrimination cases in other areas of the law. See Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 266 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
86
Bolden, 446 U.S. at 65 (internal quotation marks omitted).
87 See Issacharoff, supra note 25, at 1865-71 (discussing the interaction of

process theory and voting rights).
' Professor Ely anticipated this trend in the Court's thinking: "It would
be a tragedy of the first order were the Court to expand its burgeoning
awareness of the relevance of motivation into the thoroughly mistaken notion
that a denial of a constitutional right does not count as such unless it was
intentional." John Hart Ely, The Centralityand Limits of Motivation Analy-

sis, 15 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1155, 1160-1161 (1978).
89 See Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Amendments to Section 2 and
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Bolden intent test by adding a "results test" to Section 2 that
explicitly established a violation upon a showing of discriminatory effect alone." Three principal reasons motivated repudiating the intent test: First, demonstrating intent was "unnecessarily divisive because it involves charges of racism on the part
of individual officials or entire communities;" second, it placed
an "inordinately difficult" burden of proof on plaintiffs; and
third, it asked "the wrong question" by focusing on intent rather
than the Act's goal of equal electoral opportunity - that is, it
looked for perpetrators rather than victims." In short, the
intent test was both functionally and analytically inappropriate.
Shortly after the 1982 amendments, the Court softened its
intent stance. While still requiring intent to show a violation of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the Court held that
an electoral plan's discriminatory intent could be proved indirectly, by inference from its discriminatory effect.9 2 This rea-

soning returned the focus of the inquiry to effect while only
technically retaining the intent requirement, blurring the line
between the definitions of intent and effect and highlighting the
analytical weakness of the Court's theory of formal process
neutrality.9
The Shaw shape test now amplifies this confusion by adding another level of abstraction, purporting to be an
intent standard while using strange district shape to presume
both 94
discriminatory intent and effect - without any proof of either.

Minority Representation, in CONTROVERSIEs IN MINORITY VOTING:
VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 40, at 66, 67.

THE

' See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 1
(1982) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982)). See also Kathryn Abrams,
"RaisingPolitics Up". Minority PoliticalParticipationand Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 458-60 (1988) (discussing legislative
history and intent animating § 2's amended definition of violation); Howard M.
Shapiro, Note, Geometry and Geography: Racial Genymandering and the
Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE L.J. 189 (1984) (discussing the implications of § 2
amendments).
91

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43-44 (1986) (quoting from and
relying upon Senate Report accompanying 1982 amendments to § 2).
92 Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982) ("[Discriminatory intent need
not be proved by direct evidence.").
" See Shapiro, supra note 90, at 190-95 (discussing the inherent limitations of a pure intent standard).
" See discussion infra part III.A.2.
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2. Standardof Review: One Person, One Vote
As Justice Frankfurter predicted in Baker,judicial review of
districting has proved a challenging task, often requiring convoluted rules and complex factual inquiries.9 5 This difficulty has
tempted the judiciary to reach for bright-line measures, preferably methods with familiarity, neutrality and apparent objectivity. 6 One person, one vote is one such measure; it attempts to
ensure process neutrality by requiring every district to have the
same number of voters. Its apparent objectivity, however,
disguises the problems of arbitrariness encountered in its
application - difficulties that will be amplified by the more
subjective shape test.
The Court formally adopted the one person, one vote rule in
its 1964 decision in Reynolds v. Sims.9" The Reynolds facts
were shocking: in Alabama, the state legislative districts were
so malapportioned that population variations from district to
district were as great as forty-one to one. 98 A voter in an underpopulated rural district could cast a vote that, for the purposes of influence in the state legislature, was -forty-one times
as significant as the vote of a voter in an overpopulated urban
district. Thus, one-fourth of the state population controlled the
majority of seats in both the state Senate and House of Representatives. 99
10 0
The Court turned to one person, one vote for guidance.

5See, e.g., Bernard Grofman, Expert Witness Testimony and the Evolution
CONTROvERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 40, at 197, 197 (describing
extensive use of social scientist testimony in voting rights litigation). However, such searching inquiries are also constitutionally required because the
Fifteenth Amendment "nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes
of discrimination." Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.) (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939)).

of Voting Rights Case Law, in

9'Professor Karlan describes this as the judiciary's "deep-felt yearning for
easy-to-apply mathematical rules." Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings:
The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation,
24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 173, 179 (1989).
9'377 U.S. 533 (1964).
" Id. at 545.
99

1

Id.

The one person, one vote rule first gained currency in Gray v. Sanders,

372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) ("The conception of political equality from the
Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fif-
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It derived the rule from Article I, Section 2 and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution.'' The rule eases the
administrative burdens of judicial oversight by relying on
readily available and relatively unassailable census data, and it
conveniently spares the judiciary the "institutional discomfort"
of weighing the more substantive merits of competing theories
of fairness in the political process.'0 2 Indeed, the rule's adoption is likely rooted more in ease of administration than constitutional compulsion.0 3 The rule's limited purpose should not
be exaggerated. In contrast to the Voting Rights Act, one
person, one vote focuses not on the protection of minority voting
rights, but merely on protecting majority rule for the majority.
In theory, reasonable district population variations should
be permissible; as the Court stated at the rule's inception,
"[m]athematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable
constitutional requirement."'0 4 Acceptable justifications for
deviation from equal division, the Court has suggested, include
the districting goals of district compactness, contiguity, and
preservation of political subdivisions.'O° Preserving incumbenteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one
thing - one person, one vote."). It was soon applied to congressional apportionment in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (construing Art. I, § 2,
of the Constitution as supporting the premise that "one man's vote in a
congressional election is to be worth as much as another's") and to state
legislative apportionment in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (invalidating malapportioned state districting plan on equal protection grounds).
101 The Court founded its equipopulous requirement for federal redistricting
on the Census Clause (Art. 1, § 2, cl. 3) and for state redistricting on the Equal
Protection Clause, providing a subtle analytical distinction that permits it to
relax the one person, one vote requirement for state legislatures. See JOHN E.
NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrTUTONAL LAW § 14.36(c) (4th ed.
1991).
" See Kathryn Abrams, Relationships of Representationin Voting Rights
Act Jurisprudence,71 TEYx L. REV. 1409, 1414 (1993).
103 See ELY, supra note 2, at 120-25 (concluding that one person, one vote
was not constitutionally compelled, but was adopted primarily for reasons of
judicial administrability).
104Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964). Stated simply, "[w]e must
remember that the machinery of government would not work if it were not
allowed a little play in its joints." Id. at 577 n.57.
5
..
Id. at 578-79. Significantly, the Court accepted these justifications for
regular shape in part for their prophylactic effect: "Indiscriminate districting,
without any regard for political subdivision or natural or historical boundary
lines, may be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering."
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cies and preventing contests between incumbents may also be
legitimate state goals.'
Regardless, the Court has seized upon the rule and required
congressional districts to be all but perfectly equipopulous, °7
even at the cost of the legitimate political goal of enhancing
representation. 0 8 Professor Dixon argued that the wooden
application of rules such as one person, one vote discourages
intelligent districting solutions and exacerbates abusive gerrymandering. 10 9 Ironically, creative solutions are straitjacketed
by a rule meant to curb abuses, while abuses evade detection by

106

See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983) (suggesting that

avoiding contests between incumbents may justify some population deviation),
affd, 467 U.S. 1222 (1984); Mississippi v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 569,583
(D.D.C. 1979) (protecting incumbencies is not improper motive). Of course, in
jurisdictions in which minorities have been excluded from the political process,
it may be difficult to differentiate preservation of white incumbencies from
perpetuation of racial discrimination. See, e.g., Rybicki v. State Bd. of
Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082, 1109 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
107 See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 728, 740-42 (1983) (rejecting
congressional district population variance of 0.6984% from average as excessive), affd, 467 U.S. 1222 (1984); see also Jon M. Anderson, Comment, Politics
and Purpose: Hide and Seek in the GerrymanderingThicket After Davis v.
Bandemer, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 183, 198-202 (1987) (summarizing criticism of
Court's zealous application of equipopulous standard); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONsTrTUTIoNAL LAw § 13-6, at 1074 (2d ed. 1988) (concluding that
"as far as congressional apportionment in concerned, the possibility ofjustifying deviations from exact equality is more theoretical than real").
For state legislatures, a more liberal rule has been applied. Recent
decisions suggest that the maximum population deviation for state legislatures
that may go unquestioned is roughly 10%, with greater deviations allowable
with sufficient state justification.
See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter,
113 S. Ct. 1149, 1159 (1993) (affirming acceptability of 10% population
deviations in state legislature districts to preserve political subdivisions);
Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983) (permitting 10% deviation in state
legislature districts without requiringjustification, and allowing 89% deviation
where justified by state goal of maintaining political subdivisions). However,
permitting a fixed deviation is as much a bright-line rule as a test that allows
for none; it merely sets the line in a different place. See ELY, supra note 2, at
124 n.61.
108 See Binny Miller, Who Shall Rule and Govern? Local Legislative
Delegations, Racial Politics, and the Voting Rights Act, 102 YALE L.J. 105,
154-56 (1992) (arguing that overzealous application of one person, one vote has
resulted in arbitrary fragmentation and submergence of political subdivisions
at the expense of minorities).
109
See Robert G. Dixon, The Warren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail of
"One Man-One Vote", 1969 SUP. CT. REv. 219 (criticizing Court's elevation of
"absolutism" over "political reality").
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adherence to the letter but not the spirit of the rule."' Additionally, districting methodology has become much more sophisticated through the use of computers to massage demographic
data into countless outcomes."' Thus, a legislature bent on a
discriminatory plan can draw perfectly equipopulous districts,
the precise political impact of which is obscured from the "objective" standpoint of the districting map.
Finally, the census numbers themselves have come under
increasing attack because of their inaccuracy and systematic
undercounting of minorities." 2 In short, rigid standards serve
judicial economy, manageability, and the appearance of neutrality, but not necessarily voting rights. While an "objective" rule
is certainly appealing, such a rule may only whitewash unfairness.
3. The Significance of DistrictShape
Until recently, strange district shape was given little weight
in judicial review of districting plans," 3 and compactness did
not become a rule of the same stature as one person, one vote.
When strange shape was at issue, the courts generally used it
as collateral evidence of discrimination and not as proof of a
harm in itself. Although shape is an obvious and sometimes
disturbing characteristic, it can also be misleading. A gerry-

See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 168 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that "exclusive or primary reliance on
'one person, one vote' can betray the constitutional promise of fair and
effective representation by enabling a legislature to engage intentionally in
clearly discriminatory gerrymandering"); see also Alexander D. Rosati, One
Person, One Vote: Is It Time for a New Constitutional Principle?,
8 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 523 (1991) (arguing that one person, one vote

harms minorities).
..The influence of computers is so great that the national political
committees of major parties now provide centralized computer districting
services for use in districting battles. See Grofman, supranote 49, at 1249-50.
"1 See City of New York v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 34 F.3d 1114

(2d Cir. 1994) (requiring Secretary of Commerce to justify decision not to apply
statistical corrections to Census counts); Stephen A. Holmes, Sampling
Uncounted is Urged for Census, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 1994, at A22.
13
1
See Richard G. Niemi & John Wilkerson, Compactness and the 1980s
Districts in the Indiana State House: Evidence of PoliticalGerrymandering,
in POLITIcAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 255, 255-57 (Bernard
Grofman ed., 1990).
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mander is a political creature that can only be proven by looking at its political effects." 4
Historically, there were practical reasons for respecting
compactness and contiguity, such as ensuring that a representative could obtain adequate transportation to visit and communicate with the district's constituents;" 5 yet such physical difficulties are attenuated in modern times." 6 For example, the
entire state of Montana is one district and is extremely
noncompact, but not unmanageable. Similarly, one of the
districts challenged in Shaw was not compact, but its geographically elongated constituency was quite accessible because it was
arranged along an interstate."'
There are also political reasons for imposing compactness
requirements. The sensitivity of districting to the physical
distribution of voters may tempt the party that stands to benefit
to demand compactness. Some commentators have argued that
compactness requirements systematically benefit whites and
conservatives because of geographical segregation and urban
concentration of particular minorities."

8

114 As one political scientist explained:

Dragons, bacon strips, dumbbells, and other strained shapes are not
always reliable signs that partisan (or racial or ethnic or factional)
interests are being served, while the most regularly drawn district
may turn out to have been skillfully constructed with an intent to
aid one party. The safest and most direct indication of gerrymandering is a state-wide calculation of results.
Robert J. Sickles, Dragons,Bacon Strips, and Dumbbells - Who's Afraid of
Reapportionment?,75 YALE L.J. 1300 (1966).
"' For example, geographically compact districting "to some extent... facilitates political organization, electoral campaigning, and constituent representation." Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 756 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring), affd, 467 U.S. 1222 (1984).
11
See Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districtingin the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1,
20-22 (1985).
117 See discussion infra part II.A.
118 Professor

Karlan notes that minorities are often residentially segregated

as a result of discrimination or socioeconomic status, such that geography may
be closely tied to both political interests and racial identity. Karlan, supra
note 96, at 177. Similarly, Lowenstein and Steinberg contend that compactness requirements uniformly benefit Republicans because many of their opponents live in densely populated urban ghettoes that lend themselves to
electoral packing. See Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 116, at 23 ("[Tlhe
adoption of compactness as a criterion for drafting or evaluating districting
plans will systematically advance the interests of the Republican Party."). But
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Shaw relied most heavily for support on the Court's 1960
decision in Gomillion v. Lightfoot," a case in which shape
was a prominent but not decisive factor. In Gomillion, AfricanAmerican voters in Tuskegee, Alabama, challenged the constitutionality of a plan to redraw the Tuskegee city limits into a
jagged and convoluted shape. Justice Frankfurter, writing for
a unanimous Court, observed that the proposal "alters the shape
of Tuskegee from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided
figure."'"0 He proceeded immediately to discuss the practical
effect and discriminatory result of the new boundary:
The essential inevitable effect of this redefinition of
Tuskegee's boundaries is to remove from the city all
save four or five of its 400 Negro voters while not
removing a single white voter or resident. The result of
the [plan] ...is to deprive the Negro petitioners
discriminatorily of the benefits of residence in Tuskegee, including, inter alia,the right to vote in municipal
elections."2
Unconstitutionality was triggered by the racially discriminatory
effect - segregation of nearly every African-American outside
the city limits - and result - deprivation of the African-American municipal vote. Justice Frankfurter, an impassioned critic
of the Court's forays into the "political thicket," viewed the
Tuskegee situation as justiciable because it perpetrated egregious racial disenfranchisement, not because it was physically
ugly. 22

see Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry into the Problem
of Racial Gerrymandering Under the Voting Rights Act,
92 MIcH. L. REv. 652, 682 (1993) (arguing that avoiding compactness requirements in order to improve African-American electoral success is unfair to
Republicans).
119 364 U.S. 339 (1960).

Id. at 340.
121Id.at 341.

' Distinguishing his own decision in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549
(1946) (see supra note 72), Justice Frankfurter found that where a legislature
"singles out a readily isolated segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment" tantamount to "unequivocal withdrawal of the vote solely
from colored citizens," it was sufficient to "lift this controversy out of the
so-called 'political' arena and into the conventional sphere of constitutional
litigation." Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346-47. He cited with approval Justice
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In later decisions, the Court avoided heavy reliance on
district shape to identify unfairness. In its 1964 decision in
Reynolds v. Sims, 2 ' the Court expressly rejected Tennessee's
argument that districts should be drawn in accordance with
geographic boundaries of state political subdivisions, declaring:
"Legislators represent people, not trees or acres.""lM In 1983
when the Court settled a districting challenge in Karcher v.
Daggett 2 5 by rigid application of the one person, one vote rule,
Justice Stevens cautioned in concurrence against 'judicial preoccupation with the goal of perfect population equality."'"6 Justice Stevens suggested that "dramatically irregular shapes may
have sufficient probative force to call for an explanation," but he
agreed with Professor Dixon's dictum that gerrymandering
should not be defined exclusively by shape. 27
Nevertheless, in recent years the Court has increasingly
relied on shape. The Court first imposed shape as a limitation
on remedies for Voting Rights Act violations in 1986. In

Holmes' remark in a related context: "'Ofcourse the petition concerns political
action,' but '[tihe objection that the subject matter of the suit is political is
little more than a play upon words."' Id. at 347 (quoting Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927)).
Justice Frankfurter attempted to base the Court's intervention on narrow
Fifteenth Amendment grounds. However, because the Court soon came to
regard voting as a fundamental right, it now treats Gomillion as though setSee, e.g.,
tled on the more expansive ground of equal protection.
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 748 (1983); Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971). In Gomillion itself, Justice Whittaker's concurrence
suggested an equal protection analysis. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 349.
123 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
" Id. at 562. The Court's words are worth quoting at length:
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are
elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests. As long
as ours is a representative form of government, and our legislatures
are those instruments of government elected directly by and directly
representative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free
and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system.
Id. Note that the emphasis is on "people," not "acres." The Court proceeded
to reject the argument that the objective of creating districts roughly equal in
land area justified massive deviations from equal population, reiterating that
"people, not land or trees or pastures, vote." Id. at 580.
462 U.S. 725 (1983).
26

Id. at 750 (Stevens, J., concurring).

121Id.at 755. See also DIXON, supra note 58, at 459.
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Thornburg v. Gingles," s minority plaintiffs challenged a
multimember voting scheme that allegedly diluted their votes.
The Court held that, as an initial showing,
the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it
is sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single-member district. If it
is not, as would be the case in a substantially integrated district, the multi-member form of the district cannot
be responsible for minority voters' inability to elect its
candidates. 9
Gingles thus sets up an initial hurdle to surmount before
reaching the Section 2 totality of the circumstances inquiry,
forcing minority plaintiffs to prove they are sufficiently "politically cohesive [and] geographically insular" to form a compact
safe district. The Court narrowly reasoned that ifa safe district
remedy was impractical, the multimember scheme did not cause
any minority vote dilution - even if dilution nonetheless existed. 30 The cognizability of the harm was thus limited by
proof of the remedy.'
Gingles mistakenly gave the shape criterion a hard substantive dimension in the context of Section 2, setting the stage for
Shaw later to extend it to Section 5. To follow the Gingles
Court's reasoning, a strange-shape district is not merely an
indication of something wrong but instead is a wrong in itself,
something that a court should not impose as a remedy, even
where minorities are demonstrably shut out of the political
system. The Court thereby endeavored to avoid in the future
the uncomfortable position of having to admit that it lacks a
remedy for the geographically diffuse minority. The Court
ignored the hard question of whether to pursue more sophisti-

478 U.S. 30 (1986).
Id. at 50.

Minority plaintiffs further had to show racial polariza-

tion - that they were themselves "politically cohesive" (i.e., voted in a bloc)
and that the majority also voted as a bloc to defeat their candidates. Id.
13 0
Id. at 50 n.17.
131

These

conclusions

were

recently

reasserted

unanimously

in

Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1084 (1993) ("Unless these [Gingles] points
are established, there neither has been a wrong nor can be a remedy.") See
also Karlan, supra note 96, at 174, 201 (1989).
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cated remedies than safe districting in its attempt to hold fast
to "traditional" political principles.
4. The Safe DistrictingRemedy
When a court identifies a violation of antidiscrimination
law, it has both the power and the duty to fashion a remedy. 3
Courts have routinely ordered the creation of singlemember safe districts as the remedy of choice.'
There can be no question that safe districting works, at
least in the sense of increasing the number of minority-elected
legislators sent to Congress. Unusually aggressive attention to
minority interests in redistricting after the 1990 Census resulted in a record number of minority lawmakers.'
Yet safe
districting does seem like a counterintuitive solution for racial
discrimination in that it recognizes, and then legislates according to, racial division - in sharp contrast, for example, to the
integrationist remedies for school segregation."'

.32See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965) (courts have
'not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as
possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like
discrimination in the future"); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 183-84
(1987) (extraordinary one-for-one promotion requirement imposed to integrate
recalcitrant state trooper department is within court's broad and flexible
equitable power).
'3 Although the Supreme Court has stated that multimember districts are
not per se unconstitutional, it is clear that the courts prefer single-member
districts for non-Congressional districts. See City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55, 65-66 (1980) (citing cases); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 26-27
(1975) (court-ordered reapportionment of state legislature must use singlemember districts with minimal population variance unless there are persuasive and articulated justifications for departure). Meanwhile, federal law
mandates single-member Congressional districts. 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1988).
"' Peter Applebome, Suits Challenging Redrawn Districts That Help
Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1994, at Al. The number of African-Americans
in Congress increased from twenty-six to thirty-nine in 1992. Id. It is true
that minority-elected representatives are most often members of the group
that chose to support them, and that minority candidates have had little
success in majority-white districts. Only two of the thirty-nine AfricanAmerican representatives are from majority-white districts. See Allan J.
Lichtman, Quotas Aren't the Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1994, at A23. The
thrust of voting rights reform is that minorities ought to have equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, regardless of the race of either the voter
or the candidate.
13
1 See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act
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Whether race can be used remedially is a volatile political
and constitutional issue. Some charge that to take account of
race is just racial discrimination in another guise, contrary to
the intent of the Reconstruction Amendments and the Voting
Rights Act.13 6 There is, however, historical support for the
proposition that the Equal Protection Clause should be read as
aggressively protecting disenfranchised minorities deprived of
political recourse, and not as incorporating a formal
colorblindness rule that would prohibit race-conscious remedies."' Professor Ely characterized this countermajoritarian
function as "representation reinforcing" whereby the judiciary
provides virtual representation of minorities when political
processes fail them.'3 8
As a practical matter, colorblindness would .likely prevent
3 9 The Court has perthe construction of effective remedies."

and the Theory ofBlack ElectoralSuccess, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077,1099 (1991).
138See,

e.g., ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES CoUNT?: AFFIRMATIvE

AcTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 11 (1987) (arguing that "Itlhe Voting
Rights Act of 1965 had a simple aim: providing ballots for southern blacks").
Professor Thernstrom's basic thesis is that the Act was meant only to remove
direct barriers to African-Americans voters, such as poll taxes and literacy
tests, and that expanding the Act to supervise redistricting amounts to
unwarranted "special protection" and "affirmative action" for African-Americans. Id. at 5-6.
137
See GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 481-83 (2d ed. 1991)
(discussing enactment of Reconstruction Amendments). The first Justice
Harlan is often cited for his original suggestion that the Constitution is
colorblind. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). This was not entirely the enlightened statement it is often made out to
be; in the same breath, Justice Harlan asserted that the "white race" was
superior, and merely argued that it was not the role of the Constitution to
write that difference into law. Id.
13 See generally ELY, supra note 2 (describing the theory of representation
reinforcement).
13 As Justice Blackmun explained in a key decision permitting some forms
of affirmative action in university admissions:
I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmativeaction program in a racially neutral way and have it successful. To
ask that this be so is to demand the impossible. In order to get
beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no
other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must
treat them differently. We cannot - we dare not - let the Equal
Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
separate opinion).
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mitted a number of carefully circumscribed race-conscious remedies. For example, in Regents of the University of Californiav.
Bakke,' the Court invalidated the use of fixed quotas to set
the number of minority admissions to a state medical school,
but permitted the use of race as a factor or "plus" in an
Although the distinction between a quota
applicant's file."
that prescribes a certain result and a "plus" of indeterminate
weight is subtle, the Court did thereby strike a cautious balance
that preserved race-conscious affirmative action.
The Court's imprecise position on the constitutionality of
affirmative action generally parallels its treatment of raceconscious safe districting. Before Shaw, the primary case
addressing the propriety of manipulating district lines to reach
a predetermined racial composition was the Court's 1977 decision in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey (UJO). 2 In
UJO, the New York legislature drew a safe district with a sixtyfive percent African-American majority in an effort to comply
with the Attorney General's denial of Section 5 preclearance. 1" White Hasidic Jews in a community split by the district
challenged the apportionment under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
The Court found the plan constitutional but issued no
majority opinion. Seven of the eight Justices participating in
the decision concurred that New York's districting by racial
criteria did not unconstitutionally discriminate against the
Hasidic appellants,' 4 yet the Justices had considerable diffiFour Justices agreed that
culty agreeing why this was so.'
140

438 U.S. 265 (1978).

141 Id.

at 317-18.

Justice Powell's swing vote was responsible for this

narrow distinction. Four Justices would have struck down any sort of raceconscious plan, while the other four would have upheld the quota. Though his
opinion was joined by no one, Justice Powell's decisive vote split the difference,
agreeing with the first bloc on striking the racial quota, but with the second
bloc on approving the use of race as a factor.
142 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
143 Id. at 148-52.
'1"Id.at 145-47.
145 For the lone dissenter, Chief Justice Burger, the question was easy. He
read Gomillion broadly as concerning all districting manipulated for a "racial
result," rather than districting causing harmful racial results: "If Gomillion
teaches anything, I had thought it was that drawing of political boundary lines
with the sole, explicit objective of reaching a predetermined racial result
cannot ordinarily be squared with the Constitution." Id. at 181.
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the state's obligation to comply with the Voting Rights Act was
sufficient justification for race-conscious districting,'1 but two
of these Justices, joined by a third, went further and held that
the state had inherent constitutional power to do so.'
Two
other Justices struck out on their own and applied a Gomilliontype analysis, finding that the Hasidic appellants failed to show
the purpose or effect of discrimination on the basis of their race,
and therefore there was no need to reach the question of whether the state had power.'
Despite the differences of opinion, one rule did emerge from
UJO, a rule that a slim majority of the Court ratified as recently as 1990 in its decision in Metro Broadcastingv. FCC: Raceconscious remedial measures are not per se subject to strict
scrutiny.14 9 In Metro Broadcasting, the 5-4 Court upheld
under heightened scrutiny two FCC affirmative action programs
that awarded radio and television station licenses preferentially
to firms controlled by minorities. 5 ' Reasoning that such preferences were a rational way to enhance diversity in broadcast
programming, the Court observed that in UJO it had upheld the
constitutionality of race-consciousness to enhance diversity of
political participation:
[A] State subject to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act...
'may deliberately creat[e] or preserv[e] black majorities
in particular districts in order to ensure that its reapportionment plan complies with § 5.... [Neither the
Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment mandates
any per se rule against using racial factors in
districting and apportionment'.' 5 '

6
14
Id.

at 155-65 (White, Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, JJ.).

147 Id. at 165-68 (White, Stevens, Rehnquist, JJ.).
148Id. at 179-80 (Stewart, Powell, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
149 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
150
Id. at 564-66.
...
Id. at 584 (quoting UJO, 430 U.S. at 161). Another important consideration was that the FCC program represented federal, not state, action; the
Court held that this justified applying a more relaxed standard of review than
strict scrutiny. Id. at 563. This point is developed in greater detail in part
llI.B.1, infra.
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Metro Broadcastingnonetheless augured the Court's rising
conservatism that later provided the votes for Shaw. 5 2 In
Metro Broadcasting,Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy dissented, urging a uniform
standard of strict scrutiny for all race-conscious programs.'
Justices Kennedy and Scalia compared the majority's ruling
with the Court's infamous "separate but equal" decision in
Plessy v. Ferguson5 4 and analogized the race-consciousness of
the FCC program to Nazi racial classification and South African
apartheid statutes.'5 5 Three years later, after Justice Thomas
succeeded Justice Marshall, these Justices formed the majority
in Shaw. A majority of the Court now plainly leans toward
imposing strict scrutiny to reject most racial classifications
regardless of their purpose or whom they affect.'5 6 Typical of
this approach is the majority opinion in City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 57 in which the Court invalidated a minority
business set-aside program designed to remedy past discrimination. In stark contrast to Bakke's nuanced distinction between race quotas and race-as-a-factor, the Croson opinion
unwaveringly criticizes the use of race.'
Aside from its constitutionality, the political wisdom of raceconscious safe districting is contested for taking reform too
6 9 and down the wrong track.' 61
far,'59 not far enough,

152

Indeed, the Metro Broadcasting decision now lies in a precarious

balance. The four dissenters, joined by newcomer and affirmative action critic
Justice Thomas, formed the Shaw majority. It is thus questionable whether
Metro Broadcastingwould turn out the same today. The Court is expected to
rule soon on a federal set-aside program in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537 (3d Cir.), cert. granted 115 S. Ct. 41 (1994).
1' Id. at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
154 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
...
Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 631-33, 633 n.1 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
156

See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistrict-

ing: Drawing ConstitutionalLines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 588,
597-98 (1993).
157 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
5

Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 156, at 599-600.

The writers

describe Croson as reflecting "a new model of equal protection that narrowly
limits the use of race-conscious measures based on a norm of equal treatment
of individuals rather than the raising up of disadvantaged groups - a model
that is dedicated to the pursuit of social peace rather than social justice." Id.
159See generally THERNSTROM, supra note 136 (arguing that the current
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From a political standpoint, bolstering a group presence in one
district necessarily means weakening it in others, potentially
giving the group a voice in one area but submerging it in another. Non-safe districts become "whiter" and even less likely to
elect minority-favored candidates. Safe districting has some of
the effects of packing, particularly where a supermajority - a
majority created by a large margin - is created; a fine line
exists between remediation and discrimination. 2 Some suggest safe districting exacerbates racial divisiveness by
"balkanizing" voters into fixed racial factions.'
Members of
a majority-minority bloc may also find their political freedom
straitjacketed: because their only route to power lies in voting
together, individuals cannot switch parties or vote for candidates other than those chosen by the bloc. Finally, the token
success of electing a few minority representatives may erode
public support for deeper reform.'
Because it is tied to geographic distributions of voters, safe
districting becomes more difficult where members of a minority
group are geographically dispersed.'65 The creation of a stran-

interpretation of the Voting Rights Act amounts to impermissible affirmative
action for African-Americans); Abigail Thernstrom, By Any Name, It'sA Quota,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1994, at A23. Cf. Issacharoff, supranote 25 (arguing that
remedial districting is not affirmative action, in part because no one loses his
or her vote).
63
" See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member
Offices and the Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 1 (1991).
1
' See Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The
Question of Single-Member Districts, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135 (1993). See
generally Guinier, supra note 135 (arguing remedial trend is towards "tokenism" in black representation). Professor Guinier participated in litigating
districting disputes for the Voting Rights Section of the Department of Justice,
but argues now that safe districting "'inescapably closed the door' on the real
goal of the civil rights movement, which was to alter the material condition of
the lives of America's subjugated minorities." Id. at 1101.
.62 See Abrams, supra note 90, at 516 n.346.
16 Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993).
16 Professor Guinier terms this "the triumph of tokenism." See Guinier,
supra note 135 (arguing that the current conception of African-American
electoral success as election of African-American representatives is an inadequate and deceiving measure of empowerment).
" As one commentator observed:

"If... the black population of a city

that is forty percent black were spread evenly throughout the city, it would be
impossible to construct contiguous black-majority districts, let alone
supermajority districts." Shapiro, supra note 90, at 202.
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gely-shaped safe district compromises the districting goals of
compactness, contiguity, and preservation of political subdivisions. Strange shapes also draw public opprobrium 6 6 that
might stigmatize the minority voters the districting is intended
to protect.167 Meanwhile, members of the district who are not
part of the minority bloc are relegated to the politically marginal role of "filler people" or "electoral fodder."'"
II. THE SHAPE TEST IN SHAW V. RENO
A. THE SHAw FACTS

The 1990 Census indicated that North Carolina was entitled to be apportioned a twelfth seat in the United States House
of Representatives, requiring the state legislature to redistrict.'6 9 The Census also reported North Carolina's voting age
population of 5,022,487 was seventy-eight percent white, twenty
percent African-American, and one percent Native American. 7 Thus the non-white population accounted for between
two and three of the twelve seats apportioned.
The state legislature initially passed a redistricting plan
that included only one safe district and, pursuant to the Voting

1

A widely-cited newspaper editorial denounced the Shaw districting plan

as "political pornography."
Political Pornography- II, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 4, 1992, at A14.
167 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824. The Court offered no empirical evidence for
this claim. See discussion infra part III.A.2.
" See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 156, at 628-33 (describing as a
side effect of safe districting that "filler people" are treated as "electoral
fodder"). The irony, of course, is that this, if true, is the position formerly
occupied by minority groups absent remediation.
169 For most of this century, the number of House representatives has been
fixed by statute at 435. See 2 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). After each decennial census,
this number is automatically reapportioned among the states in accordance
with changes in state populations. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 2a-2b (1988) (providing
statutory method of federal apportionment). Thus a state's relative, not
absolute, population determines the number of representatives it receives, and
one state's gain of a seat necessarily comes at another's loss.
170 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Pub. L. No. 94-171. When
nonvoting North Carolinians are included in the count, the percentage ofAfricanAmerican residents is slightly larger, 22%. Id. A few courts have relied on
total population in resolving voting rights claims; the Court recently declined
to decide whether one was required over the other. Growe v. Emison,
113 S. Ct. 1075, 1083 n.4 (1993).
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Rights Act,1 1 submitted it to the Attorney General for
preclearance. The Attorney General objected, observing that
"the proposed configuration of the district boundary lines in the
south-central to southeastern part of the state appear to minimize minority voting strength given the significant minority
population" and contending that for "pretextual reasons" the
legislature "chose not to give effect to black and Native American voting strength in this area, even though it seems that
boundary lines that were no more irregular than found elsewhere in the proposed plan could have been drawn to recognize
such minority concentration."' 7 2 The Attorney General conditioned preclearance on the creation of a second safe district.
The legislature's revised plan complied with the letter, if
not the spirit, of the requirement of two safe districts; it included District 1, a holdover from the first plan, and the newly
drawn District 12. Both districts contained bare fifty-three
percent African-American majorities.'73
Both were also of
very irregular shape. District 1 was variously disparaged as a
"Rorschach ink-blot test" or a "bug splattered on a windshield."7" The more infamous District 12 narrowly straddled
Interstate 85 for nearly 160 miles, splitting numerous counties
with a serpentine thread at times no wider than the road itself.
The plan was widely condemned. Its design inspired one observer to quip, "Ask not for whom the line is drawn; it is drawn
to avoid thee."7 5 A state legislator remarked, "If you drove
down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of

171 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act covers 40 of North Carolina's 100

counties. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 463 (E.D.N.C. 1992); see also
28 C.F.R. Part 51, app. (1994) (listing 40 North Carolina jurisdictions covered
by § 5).
' Attorney General's letter, Appendix to Brief for Federal Appellees at
10a-lla, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357).
"'s Appendix to Brief for State Appellees at 19a-24a, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.
Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357) (data derived from 1990 Census of Population and
Housing, Pub. L. No. 94-171).
'7 4Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2820.
75

'

Id.

at 2821 (quoting Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have

Been Right If He Said: 'When it Comes to Redistricting,Race Isn't Everything,
It's the Only Thing"?, 14 CARDozo L. REv. 1237, 1261, n.96 (1993) (internal

quotation marks omitted)).
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the people in the district."'76 A newspaper editorial excoriated
77
the plan as computer-generated "political pornography.'1
Forty-two North Carolina voters, including several Democrats, and the Republican Party of North Carolina filed suit,
alleging the plan represented a political gerrymander in violation of equal protection.1 8 Finding that the plaintiffs' allegations were insufficient to show they were shut out of the political process to the degree necessary to trigger judicial scrutiny,

a three-judge district court 9 dismissed their complaint for
failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed.
In a second action, filed shortly after the first, five North
Carolina voters claimed the plan violated their alleged Fourteenth Amendment equal protection right to a colorblind apportionment. 8 ° This suit was likewise dismissed for failure to
state a claim.'
The district court, finding United Jewish
Organizations v. Carey'8 2 to control and taking judicial notice
that the plaintiffs were white, reasoned that the plan did not
violate equal protection because it was drawn with the intention
of complying with the Voting Rights Act and because white
voters statewide were still more than proportionally represented.' 83 In Shaw v. Reno,"M the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
16 Id. This joke is said to date from the 1970s, originally describing Phil
Gramm's "weirdly shaped" district in Texas. Jeffrey Rosen, Gerrymandered,
The New Republic, Oct. 25, 1993, at 12, 13 (reporting observation of Samuel
Issacharoff).
",'
PoliticalPornography- II, supra note 166 (describing North Carolina
district map as "political pornography" and a "monstrosity").
178 Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C.), affd mem., 113 S.Ct. 30
(1992).
",9The Voting Rights Act requires actions challenging the constitutionality
of electoral changes covered by the Act to be brought before a three-judge
district court. Appeal is taken to the Supreme Court. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c

(1988).
180

Because the voters were white, they were not members of a protected

class and thus did not have Voting Rights Act remedies available.
1 Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd and remanded
sub. nom. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993).
182 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
'13

Id. at 472-73.

18 The 1993 appointment of a new Attorney General, Janet Reno, resulted

in the automatic substitution of her name for Attorney General Barrs.
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B. THE "BIZARRE SHAPE" TEST

Unlike its detailed exposition of the facts, Shaw did not explore the shape test's contours in any detail. It instead left
much of the new claim's interpretation to the courts below.
Because the next section thoroughly discusses the test, only a
brief outline appears here.
1. The Majority
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, reasoned that "a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular that, on its face, it
rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort
to 'segregat[e] ...

voters' on the basis of race."' '

The majori-

ty held that such districting was presumptively a "racial gerrymander" and that a plaintiff could state a claim under the
Equal Protection Clause "by alleging that the legislation, though
race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as
anything other than an effort to separate voters into different
districts on the basis of race."'86 The Court did not decide
whether the North Carolina plan was unconstitutional; instead,
it remanded the case with instructions that "[ilf the allegation
of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the District
Court further must determine whether the North Carolina plan
is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental
interest."'" 7
The majority roundly condemned the harms inflicted by
racial classifications, making little exception for "benign"
uses. 88 Although the Court warned that "[c]lassifications of
citizens solely on the basis of race... threaten to stigmatize
individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and
to incite racial hostility,"'89 it expressly did not decide whether
the remedial use of race in creating safe districts was per se

'8 Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2826 (1993) (quoting Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960)).

18 Id. at 2828.
87

1

Id.

188 Id.
89
Id.

1
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suspect. 9 ' The new cause of action was thus confined to the
narrower instance of facially irregular districts.' 9'
2. The Dissents
Each of the three substantive dissents 9 2 touched on the
shape issue. Justice Souter bluntly attacked the shape test:
"The Court offers no adequate justification for treating the
narrow category of bizarrely shaped district claims differently
from other districting claims."'93 He argued that the Court
had normally regarded the use of race in districting differently
from its use in other governmental decisions, and could rationally accord such use heightened, rather than strict, scrutiny."M
Moreover, he criticized the Court's reacting to "the seeming
egregiousness of the redistricting now before us by untethering
the concept of racial gerrymander in such a case from the
concept of harm exemplified by dilution."'9 5
Justice Stevens emphasized that there are no constitutional
requirements of district compactness or contiguity and that
shape is at best mere evidence of wrongdoing.16 He distinguished between permissible and impermissible districting by
reference to whether a cognizable minority group was

190 The Court wrote that it "never has held that race-conscious state

decisionmaking is impermissible in all circumstances." Id. at 2824.
19 The Court "expresse[d] no view as to whether 'the intentional creation
of majority-minority districts without more' always gives rise to an equal
protection claim." Id. at 2828. The "more" that, in this case, tipped the
constitutional balance was the strange shape. The Court refused to comment
whether the claim would have been sustained had North Carolina constructed
a more compact district in a different part of the state. Id. at 2832.
192 Justice Blackmun's one-paragraph dissent stated his agreement that
"the conscious use of race in redistricting does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause unless the effect of the redistricting plan is to deny a particular group
equal access to the political process or to minimize its voting strength unduly."
Id. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He saw it as ironic that the Court
would break with precedent to create a new cause of action in "a challenge by
white voters to the plan under which North Carolina has sent black representatives to Congress for the first time since Reconstruction." Id.
193
Id. at 2848 (Souter, J., dissenting).
1 94

Id. at 2846-47.

195 Id. at 2849.
196
Id. at 2843-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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harmed.' 9 He argued that under circumstances in which gerrymandering is otherwise permissible, such as for political
reasons, and the purpose is remedial,9 8race should not make a
categorical difference to the analysis.
Justice White believed that UJO controlled, and he attacked
the shape distinction as superficial: "The Court today chooses
not to overrule, but rather to sidestep, UJO. It does so by
glossing over the striking similarities, focusing on surface
differences, most notably the (admittedly unusual) shape of the
newly created district, and imagining an entirely new cause of
action."19' 9 Justice White disputed that strange shape should
make a substantive difference if racial classifications were the
issue. 0 0 He argued that "the issue is whether the classification based on race discriminates against anyone by denying
'
equal access to the political process."'21
Concluding that the
appellants' votes had been neither denied nor diluted, Justice
White indicated that the claim should have been dismissed.
III. ANALYSIS
A. CRITIQUE OF THE SHAPE TEST
The shape test presents two immediately disquieting problems. First, to gather support for the shape test, the Shaw
Court interpreted precedent in a way that significantly distorted
established case law. Second, the decision leaves unclear what
harm the test is meant to remedy. Shaw does not explain who
the victims are, or how they are injured.

197 d.
98

Id. at 2844-45 ("If it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide
adequate representation for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews,

for Polish Americans, or for Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is
permissible to do the same thing for members of the very minority group
whose history in the United States gave birth to the Equal Protection
Clause.").
'99 Id. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting).
2 01d. at
201Id.
at

2841.
2836.
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1. Shaw's Reliance on Precedent
The Shaw shape test, as the majority conceded, represents
a departure from past theory in voting rights. The test establishes a third and "analytically distinct" ground for equal protection challenges of electoral districting, in addition to one person,
one vote and vote dilution. °2 As discussed above, prior decisions that explored shape avoided treating it as ultimate proof
or disproof of legitimacy, and the courts have frequently employed03 and held constitutional race-conscious districting reme2
dies.

As Justice White noted, the Shaw majority relied on a "curious" and shape-delimited reading of Gomillion v. Lightfoot.' °
The Shaw majority characterized the Tuskegee city boundary as
an "exercise in geometry" and an "example of... racial discrimination in voting." 205 Focusing on the geometric aspect of the
case, the majority failed to acknowledge that it was not the
shape but the discriminatory effect and result that motivated
the Gomillion Court to declare the boundary change unconstitutional.
The Shaw Court misread Gomillion. Although the
Gomillion and Shaw facts share the common feature of oddlyshaped political boundaries, the decisions bear little similarity.
Shaw looked no further than the shape, while Gomillion probed
for the pplitical and racial meaning behind the lines." 6 The
two cases are also factually distinct. In Gomillion, the change
in city boundaries segregated and destroyed African-American
votes; in Shaw, the district boundaries concentrated and enabled voting strength.
202 I d. at 2830.

203 See discussion supra parts I.C.3-4.
204 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2839 (White, J., dissenting); see supranotes 119-122
and accompanying text.
205
Id. at 2823.
206 In addition to Gomillion, the Shaw Court relied on Wright v.

Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), a case that further weakens its holding.
Wright involved not the deprivation of the vote by "fencing out" minorities, but
instead the packing of minority voters into a jagged eleven-sided congressional
district in New York City. Wright did not invalidate the plan it reviewed.
The Shaw Court mysteriously concluded that "Wright illustrates the difficulty
of determining from the face of a single-member districting plan that it
purposefully distinguishes between voters on the basis of race," Shaw, 113 S.
Ct. at 2826, yet hastily proceeded to do just that.
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Although the Shaw Court suggested that Gomillion "applied
2 °
the same reasoning,""
it did not in fact appreciate
Gomillion's firm commitment to the substantive right to vote.
Gomillion was not an opinion on district aesthetics or voting
rights remedies. Its author, Justice Frankfurter, had deep
misgivings about the Court's entry into the political thicket, but
was persuaded that the plainly racist effects of the new boundary compelled intervention. The central issue in Gomillion was
not the theoretical benefits of colorblindness but the concrete
issues of whom the plan hurt and how. In Shaw, the injured
party and the injury itself were not clearly identified.0 8
Similarly, the UJO precedent was not handled forthrightly.
As Justice White contended, the Court sidestepped it. 2 9 Assuming that UJO is still good law, it can only be distinguished
from Shaw by the element of strange shape.210 However, the
Shaw majority did not expressly rely on shape and conceded
that the districting principles of political subdivisions - compactness, contiguity, and preservation - are not
constitutional requirements, but are merely potential indicia of
"racial gerrymandering."2 ' Hence the two cases are substantively identical, both turning on race-conscious districting implemented by a state seeking Section 5 preclearance, yet they come
to opposite conclusions.
The Court made a Herculean effort to mold Shaw into a
decision about shape, perhaps to avoid a decisive confrontation
with the underlying race issue. The Court itself brought the
issue of shape to the forefront. Neither the appellants' original
claim, dismissed by the district court, of a right to a "'colorblind' electoral process,"1 2 nor the question the Court directed
the parties to brief mentioned shape. 2" The Court observed

207 Shaw,

113 S. Ct. at 2825.

2 See discussion infra part I.A.2.
2o9 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting).
210 UJO did not directly address the district shape issue; the appearance of
the disputed district was evidently not unusual. Id. at 2829 (discussing UJO).
211 'Weemphasize that these criteria are important not because they are
constitutionally required - they are not - but because they are objective
factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines." Id. at 2827 (citation omitted).
212
Id.at 2824.
23
.The question briefed by the parties was:
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that it "never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking
is impermissible in all circumstances," and it recast the
appellants' claim:
What appellants object to is redistricting legislation
that is so extremely irregularon its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races
for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional
districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification.2 14
The Court thus injected shape into the question to be decided.
The majority's analysis then focused on inferring what the
State conceded, that the challenged districts were drawn with
race in mind.21 5 However, there was never any dispute that
Districts 1 and 12 were deliberately drawn to create safe districts. The only reason the legislature enacted the second plan
was, as the Court explained, the Attorney General's objection to
the inclusion of only one safe district in the first plan.216
The shape test lacks a convincing constitutional or
precedential foundation. Whereas one person, one vote is
founded on a defensible inference from the text of the Constitution,"' no provision exists that directly or impliedly supports
a right to regular-shape districting. Thus, no method exists to
elicit from the Constitution how regular shape districting should
The Court stressed that "traditional
be administered.
districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and
respect for political subdivisions" are significant and will guide
the lower courts in adjudicating the new shape test.2 1 8 Yet
the Court's practice is to the contrary: in its rigid application of

Whether a state legislature's intent to comply with the Voting
Rights Act and the Attorney General's interpretation thereof
precludes a finding that the legislature's congressional redistricting
plan was adopted with invidious discriminatory intent where the
legislature did not accede to the plan suggested by the Attorney
General but instead developed its own.
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 653 (1992) (grant of certiorari).
214 Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993) (emphasis added).
215

Id. at 2843 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

21

6Id.at 2817.

217
21

See discussion supra part I.C.2.

8Id. at 2827.
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the equipopulous requirement to congressional districts, it has
honored these "principles" only in the breach.2 19 It is difficult
to understand why on the one hand the Court so readily sacrifices these principles for the vanishingly small advantages
derived from forcing districts to be nearly perfectly equipopulous, while on the other it grants them overriding constitutional
status when the right to an undiluted vote is directly at issue.
The shape test provides a startling contrast to the Court's
conservative, intent-based adjudication of other constitutional
claims. Although the Court until recently required a showing of
discriminatory intent to prove a constitutional violation, the
shape test liberally infers both intent and effect from evidence
as abstract as the shape of a districting map. As discussed
earlier, in City of Mobile v. Bolden,2 2 the Court required
plaintiffs making an equal protection challenge to an at-large electoral scheme to show discriminatory intent." 1 It later relaxed
that requirement, but only so far as to permit intent to be
inferred from a showing of severely discriminatory effect.2
However, under Shaw, both intent and effect are readily presumed from shape, leading quickly to strict scrutiny.2"
In justifying the application of the exacting standard of
strict scrutiny, the majority chided the dissent that "the very
reason that the Equal Protection Clause demands strict scrutiny
of all racial classifications is because without it, a court cannot
determine whether or not the discrimination truly is
'benign." '
Yet there was no evidence that the state legislature adopted the race-conscious plan with an intent to discriminate. Nothing in the record justified the Court's conclusory
22 5
labels of "racial classification" or "benign discrimination.

21

See supra notes 104-111 and accompanying text.

220

446 U.S. 55 (1980).

1 1

See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.

Although the Court held out the possibility that this presumption could
be rebutted, the strident tenor of the opinion makes it clear that this window
of opportunity is narrow. See infra part III.B.1.
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2830 (1993).
"Benign discrimination" is an oxymoron, given the firmly negative
association given discrimination and race. Justice Souter indicated in dissent
that he would distinguish between permissible and impermissible awareness
of race rather than forgive certain kinds of discrimination as benign. Id. at
2848 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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2. Where Is the Injury?
It should be uncontroversial, and is probably constitutionally required, that the federal courts should not remedy illusory
wrongs.2 26 The Shaw Court, however, provided little indication of what harm might be caused by the redistricting plan at
issue. The North Carolina plan, the Court claimed, "bears an
uncomfortable resemblance to apartheid" and "reinforces the
perception that members of the same racial group - regardless
of their age, education, economic status, or the community in
which they live - think alike., 227 "It is unsettling how closely
the North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial
gerrymanders of the past. '221 "Racial gerrymandering, even
for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial
229 Finally: "By perpetuating such notions, a racial
factions.."
gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc
voting that [safe] districting is sometimes said to counteract."2 ' But none of these suppositions was proven.
There was substantial evidence in the record, however, that
the strange shapes of Districts 1 and 12 resulted from merely
political considerations. According to the Attorney General's
denial of preclearance, the legislature could have constructed a
second safe district of reasonable shape in a different part of the

6

Technically, the doctrine of standing should prevent plaintiffs from

bringing suit when they personally have not suffered injury, in part to avoid
entangling the unelected judiciary with the political branches of government.
However, the Court's conception of standing in affirmative action cases,
including Shaw, has become so expansive as to provide little, if any, restraint.
See Northeastern Fla. Ch. of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2303 (1993) (granting standing to white plaintiff
challenging affirmative action program, though redressability of the injury had
not been shown; the Court held that plaintiffs interest in equal protection of
the laws sufficed for standing purposes); Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 426
(E.D.N.C. 1994) ("[W]e think the Shaw Court must have intended to transpose
to race-based districting the expansive concept of standing to challenge born
in Bakke and brought to maturity in NortheasternFloridaContractors."). See
generally Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REv.
(forthcoming July 1995) (arguing that Court's law of standing is racially
skewed to the disadvantage of minority plaintiffs).
27 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
Id. at 2824.
2832.

29 Id. at

230Id.

1994]

THE DISTRIcT SHAPE TEST

315

state,2 1 but the state instead designed its own irregular District 12. The first challenge to the plan was brought and lost by
Republicans as a political gerrymandering claim. 2
Although the Bush Administration may have hoped otherwise, the final plan, with its two strange-shape safe districts,
led to the re-election of six incumbent Democratic representatives from the non-safe districts.2 3 3 The Democratic legislature, compelled by the Republican Attorney General to redraw
the districting plan, carefully manipulated all of the districts so
as not to unseat any white incumbent Democratic representatives.2 4 Contrary to the Court's implication, the legislature's
actions were not of the kind that "can be understood only as an
effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because
of their race.""

As a general matter, there is nothing inherently racial
about a strange-shape gerrymander. The most extraordinarily
contorted gerrymanders have been drawn for ordinary political
reasons. For example, the eponymous gerrymander was drawn
in 1812 for political reasons, strengthening Massachusetts
Governor Gerry's Republican party.26 Similarly, the Shaw
districts were drawn with partisan power in mind, carefully
protecting sensitive Democrat incumbencies.2 3 '

The Court

" See Attorney General's Letter, app. to Brief for Federal Appellees at
10a-lla, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357).
232 Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C.), affd mem., 113 S. Ct. 30
(1992). Art Pope, the lead plaintiff from the dismissed action, was later
permitted to intervene in the consideration of the Shaw case on remand as an
additional plaintiff. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
' Results of Contests for the U.S. House, District by District,N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 1992, at B18; See Patrick'sActions on Minority DistrictsLeave Doubts,
4 No. 12 DOJ ALERT 2, July 4, 1994 (Prentice Hall Law and Business) ("The
[Voting Rights Act] was aggressively enforced by the Bush administration
after political strategists concluded that separating white Democrats and black
Democrats could give Republicans an edge in the white districts.").
' Professors Polsby and Popper suggest that foremost on the legislature's
agenda was protecting "Steve Neal of the ugly Fifth District [and] Charlie
Rose of the very ugly Seventh District." Polsby & Popper, supra note 118, at
653.
' Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993).
236 Eric J. Stockman, ConstitutionalGerrymandering: Fonfara v. Reapportionment Commission, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1227, 1227-28 (1993).
17 Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 156, at 590-91.
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seems to have disregarded these facts and relied on its visceral
reaction to the political nature of the gerrymander.
The Court's intimations of apartheid and an "effort to
segregate the races" are startling and ironic." Far from being black townships, both safe districts were approximately
fifty-three percent African-American; as Professor Guinier
observed, District 12 "was bizarrely shaped to link urban voters
together, to create one of the most integrated urban districts in
North Carolina and to protect the incumbency of some white
Democrats., 239 If compactness is understood functionally as a
value that enhances the operation of the district as a political
entity,24 0 arranging District 12 along a highway ostensibly
makes it easy for the district representative to visit his or her
constituency."4
Far from being irrational, the plan was an
historic achievement of African-American electoral success in
North Carolina, restoring a rough sense of proportionality. The
African-American population in North Carolina accounts for between two and three of the state's seats in the House of Representatives, and the plan gave these voters an opportunity to
choose candidates for two of these seats for the first time in
modern history.
The Court suggested several times that race-consciousness
might inflict racial stigma. Shaw warns that "[classifications
of citizens solely on the basis of race ... threaten to stigmatize
individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and
to incite racial hostility. ''24 2 This language evokes the classic
racial stigma case, Brown v. Board of Education, in which
the Court held that segregation of the races in public education
unconstitutionally denigrated and stigmatized African-American
238
'"

Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
See Reuben, supra note 14, at 39 (reporting remarks of Professor

Guinier).
" At least one court adopted a functional tack by defining a compact
district as a district having a "sense of community." Dillard v. Baldwin
County Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1465 (M.D. Ala. 1988).
"' The placement of the highway itself may have had political roots.
Melvin Watt, the U.S. Representative elected from District 12 in 1992,
suggested that the interstate was built where it was because the path of least
resistance lay through African-American communities. Brian Naylor, BlackMajority Districts Face Charges of Gerrymandering (NPR radio broadcast,
Mar. 1, 1994).
242 Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993).
24

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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The Brown Court, relying partly on sociological
children. 2'
evidence, concluded that "[sleparate educational facilities are
'
To separate children "solely because
inherently unequal."2 45
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone."2"
However, in Shaw no districting-induced stigma or racial
hostility was alleged or found. Justice Souter sharply questioned the Court's invocation of stigma, commenting that it was
"utterly implausible" to presume that strange-shape districts
could inflict stigma on white voters in any way comparable to
that inflicted on African-American children by segregation in
Brown." 7 Given the Shaw Court's generous sense of standing, the Court may have even felt that the black voters, not the
white plaintiffs, suffered this stigmatic injury. Again, however,
in contrast to Brown, the Court presented no evidence of such
stigma in this or any other case of race-conscious districting.
The only stigma suggested by the facts was that African-American voters were deliberately deprived of political participation
for so long solely because of their race.
Finally, one of the harms perceived by the Court might be
an "aesthetic" injury."8 The Shaw majority earnestly asserted that "reapportionment is one area in which appearances do
matter."'" 9 The slip opinion underscores the Court's belief in
appearances: stapled in the middle is a large color map of the
contested districting plan."' The description of District 12
also suggests exploitation: the plan "winds in snake-like fashion
through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing
areas 'until it gobbles in enough enclaves of black neighbor-

244

1d. at 494.

Id. at 495.
2'6 Id. at 494.
24 7
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2849 n.9 (Souter, J. dissenting).
248 The majority's offense at the appearance of the district is apparent from
its repeated references using the expression "on its face" or a similar variation
fourteen times. Id. passim.
2A5

249

Id. at 2827.

Several other opinions, including Gomillion, Karcher, and Bandemer,
included maps to illustrate irregular political boundaries. None, however,
used shape as a test of constitutionality. See discussion supra part I.C.3.
20
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hoods.' 2 "' However colorful these depictions may be, they
have little relevance to the Constitution.
The Court's ambiguity concerning injury is difficult to
explain as anything but frank hostility towards affirmative
action. Notably, the Court's agnostic stance as to who may be
injured in North Carolina conflicts with its own findings of only
253 the Court
a few years earlier. 2 In Gingles v. Thornburg,
acknowledged ample racial discrimination and polarization in
the state. 2 1 Yet only ill-defined questions of appearances
dominate Shaw. As one article about Shaw commented: "In
the absence of any real content to the Court's repeated invocation of the 'traditional principles of districting,' we are left with
the gnawing impression that the rules of the game were
changed only when minorities started to figure out how to
255
play."
The new rules are strange ones. The label "political pornography," applied in a newspaper editorial to the Shaw

2"1 Shaw, 113 S. Ct at 2821 (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 476-

77 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (Voorhees, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
22 The Court expressed interest in the appellants' arguments that "there
is no evidence of black political cohesion" and that "recent black electoral
successes demonstrate the willingness of white voters in North Carolina to
vote for black candidates," citing the narrow defeat of Harvey Gantt, an
African-American contender for Jesse Helm's Senate seat in 1990. Id. at 2831.
However, it is evident that the two safe districts, not the enlightenment of
white voters, precipitated the election of the first African-American representatives from North Carolina in nearly a hundred years. The failure of AfricanAmericans to stop the reelection of Senator Helms was testimony not to lack
of cohesion, but to the majority's overwhelming power in racially polarized
voting: Ninety-three percent of African-American voters supported Helms'
opponent. 1990 Elections State by State, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 8, 1990, at B8.
Additionally, the Attorney General's refusal to grant § 5 preclearance is
not ad hoc; it is based on specific factfinding procedures established by the
Department of Justice. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.51-.61 (1994) (setting forth factors
and standards used by Attorney General in making substantive determinations under § 5). The Court did not account for its disregard of the "considerable deference" it until recently accorded the factual determinations of the
Attorney General when enforcing the Voting Rights Act. See NAACP v.
Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 178-79 (1985). But see
Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820, 831 (1992) ("Deference does
not mean acquiescence.")
2

478 U.S. 30 (1986).

2'

Id. at 38-41.

" Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 156, at 638.
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districting, 256 may better describe the Court's weak resolution
of the case. Like the judiciary's labored efforts to define obscenity, the Shaw test is reminiscent of the dictum "I know it when
I see it." 7 Although the Court denied any need to resort to
such a dreaded subjective standard,"5 it offered no objective
standard of its own. 9 Indeed, even Shaw's application to its
own facts is ad hoc. While the Court focused on the "snakelike"
District 12, it noticeably ignored the "Rorschach ink-blot" District 1.260

Is a distinction to be drawn between snakes and

ink-blots?
Shaw's inability to identify the nature of the harm and its
lack of meaningful standards will spawn adverse effects not just
in the courts, but also in state legislatures. Without a threshold
definition of how irregular is too irregular, and without a nexus
between irregularity and harm, legislators will not be able to
choose intelligently among alternative plans. If the legislature
must comply with the Voting Rights Act, race will be a prominent factor in its decisionmaking, thus implicating Shaw. An
irregular remedial plan will have to be "narrowly tailored" to its
purpose, presumably by being no more irregular than all available alternatives and perhaps by narrowing the majority-minority ratio that is considered "safe."2'' Because Shaw assumed
PoliticalPornography7

II, supra note 166.

" This phrase was coined by Justice Stewart in the obscenity case
Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
' Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993) (denying reliance on "Iknow
it when I see it").
There have been, for example, many proposals for mathematical indices
of district shape. See, e.g., Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third
Criterion: Compactness as a ProceduralSafeguard Against PartisanGerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL'f REV. 301, 348-51 (1991); Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U.S. 725, 757 n.19 (1983), affid, 467 U.S. 1222 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing numerous proposals). Of course, the mere possibility of numerical
rules does not answer the fundamental question of whether regular shape has
anything to do with political fairness.
260 See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 156, at 624 n.154.
261
As Professors Pildes and Niemi correctly point out, to conclude that
"narrowly tailored' districts "must be drawn in the most compact way possible" makes little sense in strict scrutiny analysis, because "[tlhe purpose of
demanding close connections between means and ends is to ensure that the
state is not covertly pursuing forbidden ends," not to enforce the constitutionally optional goal of compactness. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi,
Expressive Harms, "BizarreDistricts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-DistrictAppearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 584-85
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and did not prove harm, the Court provided legislators - and
district court judges - no guidance in comparing plans or
knowing when and how to sacrifice the efficacy of the remedy
for the regularity of the shape. Remedial districting may be
reduced to rough gambles and guesswork.
Unless narrowly defined, the Shaw test will reiguite litigation every ten years as the decennial federal census compels
redistricting. As legislators attempt to avoid controversy, the
test will have a chilling effect on plans that may never enter a
courtroom. The imposition of strict scrutiny will more often
than not seal the fate of many remedial plans. Even if a plan
ultimately prevails, it will do so only after subjecting the state
to costly litigation under the time pressure of an impending
election. While race-conscious measures are still permitted,
their scope is now uncertain.26 2

B. THE FUTURE OF VOTING RIGHTS REFORM
Shaw has far-reaching importance. As the foregoing discussion shows, Shaw accomplished much more than creating a
seemingly obscure voting rights claim. The decision has already
played an important role in redistricting litigation in California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas, leading to the invalidation of remedial
plans or dismissal of Section 2 challenges in the latter five cases. 263 Aside from the Shaw test's broad application and poten-

(1993). The argument in this Note, however, is that there was never any
suggestion that the state was pursuing covert ends. The Shaw decision will
chill legislatures from pursuing worthwhile ends, such as compliance with the
Voting Rights Act, by imposing a senseless presumption of guilt on irregular
districts.
62 As Justice O'Connor noted, the Court "never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible in all circumstances." Shaw, 113
S. Ct. at 2824. However, given her emphasis on the potential harms of raceconsciousness per se, Justice O'Connor would be unlikely to give much
substance to this concession.
263 See Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C.) (upholding plan),
petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 6439 (U.S. Nov. 21, 1994) (No. 94-923);
Dewitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409, 1411-13 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (same), petition
for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3127 (U.S. Aug. 8, 1994) (No. 94-275); Bridgeport
Coalition v. City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 1994) (same), vacated on
other grounds, 115 S. Ct. 35 (1994); Marylanders for Fair Representation v.
Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Md. 1994) (same); see also White v. Alabama,
867 F. Supp. 1519 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (extending Shaw principles to judicial elec-
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tially severe consequences, the Court's reliance on shape provides only the barest restraint on invalidating virtually all colorHowever, the Court still has many
conscious remedies."
opportunities to change course, some of which are explored

below.
1. Protectingthe Voting Rights Act
The construction given to the Shaw test by the lower courts
provides a potential defense for the Voting Rights Act. The
lower court interpretations have varied widely. One district
court went so far as to ignore Shaw's limiting language altogether, reading Shaw's requirement of irregularity as an "evidentiary 'minuet" for proving race-conscious intent and invalidating a fairly ordinary-looking safe district." 5 On the other
hand, on remand the district court in North Carolina also
treated shape as a circumstantial consideration, but upheld the
dramatically irregular Shaw plan in its entirety. 6 6
Some courts have overlooked the Supreme Court's curious
and potentially important point that a Shaw presumption of
"racial gerrymandering" might be rebuttable by the state.
Specifically, the Court held that strict scrutiny would apply on

tions and upholding remedial plan). But see Jeffers v. Tucker, 847 F. Supp.
655, 661-62 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (rejecting § 2 challenge); Sanchez v. Colorado,
861 F. Supp. 1516, 1522-23 (D.Colo. 1994) (same); Johnson v. Miller, 864 F.
Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga.) (invalidating remedial plan), prob.juris. noted, 115 S.
Ct. 713 (1995); Hays v. Louisiana, 862 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La.) (same), prob.
juris. noted, 115 S.Ct. 687 (1994); Houston v. Lafayette County, 841 F. Supp.
751, 765-66 (N.D. Miss. 1993) (rejecting § 2 challenge); Vera v. Richards, 861
F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex.) (invalidating remedial plan), petition for cert. filed,
63 U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1994) (No. 94-805).
264 For a contrary view, see Pildes & Niemi, supra note 261, at 495 n.57
(arguing that Shaw "does not stand for, or portend a sweeping proscription on,
intentional race-conscious districting that does not involve actual vote dilution.").
26 Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1197 (W.D. La. 1994) ("Hays I"),
vacated and remanded, 114 S.Ct. 2731 (1994). The Supreme Court vacated
this decision because the Louisiana legislature passed a new districting plan
while its appeal was pending. Nevertheless, the Louisiana court invalidated
the new plan after applying the same per se rule that race-conscious
districting always requires strict scrutiny. Hays v. Louisiana, 862 F. Supp.
119, 122-23 (W.D. La.) ("Hays II"), prob.juris. noted, 115 S.Ct. 687 (1994).
' Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C.), petition for cert. filed, 63
U.S.L.W. 6439 (U.S. Nov. 21, 1994) (No. 94-923).
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remand if "the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains
uncontradicted. ''26 7 The state must essentially show that it
did not engage in "racial gerrymandering," but because this
term remains undefined, the amount of proof required to rebut
is ambiguous. Race, as the Court has acknowledged, is often a
legitimate part of political decision-making. 268 Because of the
novelty of the Shaw claim, the line where a districting plan
crosses over from race-conscious to race-based remains unclear.
However, if courts properly construe race-consciousness in
service to the Voting Rights Act as not just tolerable but required, they may avoid application of strict scrutiny altogether.
Where the Shaw presumption of a "racial gerrymander" remains uncontradicted, the courts must apply strict scrutiny. In
doing so, the courts must determine whether the legislature
intended to comply with the Voting Rights Act, and whether
compliance is a compelling state interest. If so, the plan must
also be the least restrictive means of compliance. Strict scrutiny is a deliberately stringent standard and has been described
as "'strict' in theory, fatal in fact., 269 It is too soon to tell how
these standards will evolve. Voting rights cases are so fact-specific that they defy ready comparison to one another. In any
event, the decisions of the lower courts will as a matter of
course be appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Court will
have the final say.
Although the Shaw Court avoided addressing the fundamental validity of color-conscious measures under the Voting
Rights Act, it is inevitable that the Court will soon review a
case that requires choosing between permitting a violation of
the Act and imposing a remedy that violates the Court's conception of colorblind equal protection. The Court has unmistakably
expressed a narrow view of the permissible scope of
antidiscrimination measures under a "colorblind" Fourteenth
Amendment. 7 ' When presented with a choice between nar267

Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832. See also id. at 2830 ("[Ihf appellants' allega-

tions of a racial gerrymander are not contradicted on remand, the District
Court must determine whether the General Assembly's reapportionment plan
satisfies strict scrutiny.").
26 United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 155-65 (1977).
219See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a

Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
8 (1972).
2.0In response to, but not reaching the merits of, the Shaw appellee's
contention that compliance with the Voting Rights Act by safe districting was
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rowing the inherently color-conscious Act and expanding
colorblindness,
the Court will likely conclude that the Act must
71
2

yield.

However, there are a number of important grounds upon
which the Court should uphold safe districting and preserve the
viability of color-conscious remedies. At the most basic level,
the Court must consider the Voting Rights Act's grounding in
the Fifteenth Amendment and the fundamental significance of
the right to vote. To the extent that the Act is consistent with
the Fifteenth Amendment, it cannot, as a matter of constitutional construction, be inconsistent with the earlier-ratified Fourteenth Amendment. If balancing is required, or even constitutionally permitted, the essential right to vote, the right that is
"preservative of all rights,"2 72 must outweigh the essentially
policy-based objective of colorblindness.
Furthermore, the Court has held that acts of Congress are
entitled to special deference for several reasons.
First, the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by its
own terms applies only to the states.7 4 However, the Court
held that equal protection regulates the federal government as
an implied component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

a compelling state interest, the Court sounded a dubious note:
"The States certainly have a very strong interest in complying with
federal antidiscrimination laws that are constitutionally valid as
interpreted and as applied. But in the context of a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge, courts must bear in mind the difference
between what the law permits, and what it requires."
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2830 (1993). See also discussion supra part
I.C.4.
271 Because many critical civil rights and equal protection decisions have
been such close cases, the Court's decision will likely turn in part on its
membership. Since Shaw was decided, Justice Ginsberg and Justice Breyer
have replaced two of the Shaw dissenters, Justice White and Justice
Blackmun. It is too soon to judge how these changes will affect the Court's
view of voting rights and race issues.
2 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (quoting Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
' For the Voting Rights Act to receive the benefit of such deference, safe
districting plans enacted by state legislatures in order to comply with the Act
must be construed as federal action delegated to the state.
' 4 The Equal Protection Clause provides: "No State shall... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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Amendment.7 5 In Metro Broadcasting v. FCC. 6 the Court
held that because of this analytical distinction, federal raceconscious affirmative action programs were properly subjected
to heightened scrutiny, an intermediate standard of review,
rather than strict scrutiny. 7 Second, the Metro Broadcasting
Court reasoned that the national legislature could be accorded
greater deference because it was less susceptible than local
governments to manipulation by minority racial factions. Thus,
the Court further distinguished the case, and perhaps the Act,
as that struck down in City of Richfrom local programs such
27 8
mond v. J.A Croson Co.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, both the majority
and the dissenters in Metro Broadcastingagreed that Congress
has remedial power to expand constitutional safeguards under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 9 In her plurality
opinion in Croson, Justice O'Connor distinguished state and
local from federal affirmative programs by observing that "[the
Section 51 power to 'enforce' may at times also include the power
to define situations which Congress determines threatens
principles of equality and to adopt prophylactic rules to deal
Congress' power to create affirmawith those situations." '
tive action statutes, though currently ill-defined, strengthens
the Act against a colorblindness challenge.2"'

275 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
276 497
27 7

U.S. 547 (1990).

Id. at 564.

27

Id. at 565-66.

See Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).

This reasoning also

appeared in Bakke, in which Justice Powell distinguished the districting plan
in UJO as representing an authoritative determination of discrimination and
remedy by a state legislature. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 304 (1978). The admissions program in Bakke was entitled to less
deference because it was created by the state regents and lacked any authoritative determination of the existence of past discrimination. Id.
9
2"
Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65 (majority opinion), 605-06
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). However, the case did not require the Court to
resolve the scope of the power to expand constitutional safeguards.

s Croson, 488 U.S. at 490.
The Voting Rights Act was enacted pursuant to Congress' power under
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. However, the Court deemed the right
to vote fundamental in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964), and for
Congress to legislate under its § 5 power, it need not "recite the words 'section
5' or 'Fourteenth Amendment' or 'equal protection."' EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U.S. 226, 243 (1983).
21
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Remedial voting rights measures should be permitted
greater latitude in the use of race than other forms of affirmative action. As the Court explained in Regents of the University
of Californiav. Bakke, 2 the purpose of these measures is "to
improve the previously disadvantaged group's ability to participate, without excluding individuals belonging to any other group
from enjoyment of the relevant opportunity - meaningful
participation in the electoral process."2" Although a university implementing affirmative action may have to exclude some
and preferentially admit others on the basis of race, with remedial districting everyone still has the opportunity to vote."'
Some will argue that remedial districting merely grants the
minority the power to "reverse discriminate." However, this
argument reflects a basic misunderstanding of two issues:
First, the majority will continue to win in the non-safe districts
in rough proportion to its numbers. It is at most deprived of the
power, for which it has no right, to maximize its representation
by dominating all of the districts.
Second, the cynical hypothesis that the minority will become as overbearing as the majority if only given the chance is
not supported by evidence or logic. On the contrary, the
minority's interests are better served by negotiating with the
majority, even if the minority need not do so to win individual
seats. If minority members are to have any hope of influencing
legislative decisions, of expanding their political influence
beyond the confines of the safe districts, or of diversifying their
political ranks along the spectrum from liberal to conservative,
they must form interracial coalitions. Thus, the ultimate
significance of the remedy lies in providing the minority a choice
where it had none before.
2. Improving JudicialReview and Remedies
The shape test adds disarray to the Court's standards of
review in voting rights cases and complicates the design of
remedies. The Court's post-Baker over-reliance on single standards, such as one person, one vote, and its failure to articulate
a coherent set of standards are taking their toll. As Justice
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438 U.S. 265 (1978).

2s Id. at
'

305.

Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2846 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Frankfurter predicted, fairly indeterminate policy considerations
inevitably must be weighed in developing such standards. 5
One person, one vote dealt only with the first and simplest
part of the judicial review puzzle, that of preserving majority
rule for the majority. As the electorate has diversified, the
thorny problem of protecting minority voting rights has grown
in prominence. That there is no "quick fix" similar to one
person, one vote should be no surprise. The practical fairness of
electoral practices, as the amended Section 2 recognizes, can be
meaningfully judged only by the totality of the circumstances.28 6 Moreover, in accordance with the Act and the Court's
practice before Shaw, an electoral practice should be judged discriminatory only when it directly or indirectly causes the classic
harm of vote dilution or another constitutionally-recognized

injury.
Although regular district shape does not equate with political fairness, 28 ' aesthetic values are not wholly irrelevant. Bizarrely shaped safe districts, despite their remedial purpose,
may significantly detract from the perceived legitimacy of the
electoral system.288 Yet a sense of proportion must be maintained. Familiar appearances are scant comfort for those whom
the status quo leaves in the cold.289 As Professor Dixon ob-

m See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
228

42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
But cf. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 261, at 484 (Shaw "reaffirms the

continuing centrality of physical territory to legitimate political representation").
288 For example, Professor Grofinan proposes, but does not fully develop, a
"cognizability" standard, suggesting the test of acceptable districting should be
whether it is readily understandable to the average person. Grofinan, supra
note 49, at 1262. In particular, he believes that "[clentral to American politics
is the notion that representation should be based on geographically defined
districts." Id. However, the practical and aesthetic advantages of such
districts may be outweighed by the right of political participation.
"' For an instructive discussion of reliance on tradition to establish or
challenge the legitimacy of a practice, see Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and
Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177 (1993). Professor Brown notes that "objectivity,
neutrality and legitimacy are illusory when dependent on a theory of interpretation that yields to the judgments of others through traditionalism." Id. at
210. While agreeing that use of tradition enhances the legitimacy of the
Court's decisions, Brown argues that the Court should be more forthright
about tradition's limitations and concede that few decisions are truly dictated
by tradition; some problems do not have "correct" solutions. Id. at 211-12.
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served, districts must be judged by the function they serve, not
the form they take. ° Safe districting will result at times in
strange-shape districts, especially when mixed with strange
politics.
Although, as this Note argues, safe districting and even
strange-shape safe districting are correctly deemed constitutional, it does not follow that they are always the wisest or best
alternatives.29 ' Safe districting is vulnerable to criticism for
its rigidity, geographic constraints, manufacture of unwieldy
shapes, straitjacketing of the minority voting bloc, strengthening of the white majority bloc in non-safe districts, and
marginalization of majority members left in the safe district - "electoral fodder" put in the shoes of the minority.292
Additionally, the practical effect of the shape test sharply
reduces the usefulness of the safe districting remedy. Restricting the safe districting remedy to some ideal of regular shape
will permit the remedy to work only where the excluded group
Strange-shape districts may arouse concern in part because of arbitrary
assumptions about democracy that society inculcates in us at a young age. As

an illustrative example, Professor Guinier tells this anecdote about her then
four-year-old son, Nikolas:
Nikolas and I had a conversation about voting prompted by a
Sesame Street Magazine exercise. The magazine pictured six children: four had raised their hands because they wanted to play tag;
two had their hands down because they wanted to play hide-andseek. The magazine asked its readers to count the number of
children whose hands were raised and then decide what game the
children would play.
Nikolas quite realistically replied: "They will play both. First
they will play tag. Then they will play hide-and-seek."... In a
nutshell, Nikolas had expressed the goal of my work: to find voting
rules that allow both winners and losers to play.
Lani Guinier, Who's Afraid of Lani Guinier?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.1., Feb. 27,
1994, at 38, 41. The child did not give the winner-take-all answer the
magazine wanted. Yet what "looked right" to the child is not antidemocratic;
it reflects James Madison's understanding of the justice in sharing power.
29
o See DIXON, supra note 60, at 459.
91 As Justice Frankfurter cautioned in another context:
Our constant preoccupation with the constitutionality of legislation
rather than with its wisdom tends to preoccupation of the American
mind with a false value. The tendency of focusing attention on
constitutionality is to make constitutionality synonymous with
wisdom, to regard a law as all right if it is constitutional.
Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 670 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2
See supra notes 159-168 and accompanying text.

328 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol.4:273
is densely packed together, physically separate from other voter
groups. Physically integrated but politically excluded groups
will have no remedy at all. Gingles first limited the availability
of relief under Section 2, and Shaw now extends this limitation
to Section 5.
Alternative remedies must be explored. The lesson of Shaw
should not be that we have reached the constitutional limits of
the Voting Rights Act, but that we have perhaps reached the
political limits of the single-member districting model. A more
"narrowly tailored" race-conscious remedy might also better
endure the Court's scrutiny in the face of an equal protection
challenge.
The courts can encourage voting rights litigants to adopt
alternative remedies voluntarily, as by consent decree, but the
courts' powers to force them to do so are probably limited.2 93
Congress, with its superior fact-finding ability, is a better forum
than the courts for exploring modifications or alternatives to
safe districting. It can also enact legislation to permit or encourage the adoption of more sophisticated remedies. 4 In
1982 Congress clarified the judicial standards of voting rights
violations by amending the Act. Learning from the experience
of the courts, it can now flesh out more sophisticated remedies.
In areas where multiracial coalitions are practical, one
solution lies in a milder version of safe districting that recognizes the importance of "strong plurality" or "influence districts,"
within which a minority group has substantial but not overwhelming influence in a greater number of districts."
A
wider distribution of sympathetic voters would help minority
politicians generate the broader support needed to pursue
higher offices. 9 6 Influence districting would also permit the

293

See Cane v. Worcester County, 35 F.3d 921 (4th Cir. 1994) (abuse of

discretion for trial court to order unwilling county to implement cumulative
voting remedy).
294 For example, federal law currently requires single-member districts in
congressional elections and must be modified if alternatives are to be implemented. 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1988).
295 See Karlan, supra note 160 (criticizing single-member districting as
failing the goals of the Voting Rights Act). However, influence districts are
presently thought to be nonjusticiable, in part because of the difficulty in
developing standards by which to judge them. See Gingles v. Edmisten, 590
F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984); Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La.
1983); Guinier, supra note 15 at 1425 n.44, 1452 n.146.
216 See CAROL M. SwAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRESEN-
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courts to recognize the right of minority plaintiffs to bring
Voting Rights Act suits even when they are unable to satisfy the
requirement of being able to establish a safe disGingles
297
trict.

More substantial departures from classic single-member
districting must also be considered.298 Choosing among them
is difficult because of their relatively complex rules, because
political theory must be contended with closely, and because
decisions like Shaw and Gingles, which emphasize familiarity as
a test of validity, cause reflexive public hostility to change.2 99
However, neither tradition nor familiarity provide answers to
the long-standing problems of racial division and polarization.
Among the most promising approaches are those that
partially dispense with districting yet skirt the pitfalls of the atlarge and multimember election."'0 For example, Professor
° a scheme that uses a
Guinier promotes cumulative voting,'O
relatively large multimember district in which each voter receives a number of votes equal to the number of representatives
to be elected. These votes can be cast each for different candidates or all for the same candidate. A candidate must still
receive a majority of votes to become elected; thus, it is not a
proportional representation system.
For example, in a hypothetical election of five city council
members, each voter has five votes. If the election were run
under traditional majoritarian rules, a fifty-one percent majority

(1993).
9 In Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 397 n.24 (1991), the Court ex-
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pressed in passing the more expansive view that a small minority group of
voters might have standing to bring a Voting Rights Act claim that their right
of political participation had been infringed, due to their ability to influence
(but not control) the outcome of elections.
298 See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 90, at 520-31 (discussing alternatives to
safe districting).

I See Anna Quindlin, PoliticalIlliteracy, N.Y. TIMEs, June 6, 1994, at D5
(discussing public hostility over the Guinier nomination based on second-hand
perceptions, rather than direct knowledge, of her proposed voting rights
reforms).

3 See supra part I.B.
o Corporate law currently employs cumulative voting to protect minority

interests. The discussion here is adapted from Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, And Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor's Clothes,
71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1632-41 (1993) (describing alternative voting schemes,
including cumulative voting).
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could choose all five members seriatim. However, a cumulative
system does not require each voter to cast one vote for each of
five candidates; instead, the voter can cast two votes for one
candidate and three for another, or all five votes for the same
candidate. 0 2 The majority can therefore elect several, but not
all, of the representatives, because the minority does not
"waste" its votes in losing head-to-head contests for individual
seats. If polarization diminishes and interracial coalitions form,
the minority voters can spread their votes to exert more diffuse
political influence without redistricting and without penalty. As
Professor Guinier explains, such voting "would allow voters, by
the way they exercise their votes, to 'district' themselves based
This reon what they think rather than where they live." '
medial approach has already been applied to public elections on
a small scale 0 4 and is gaining mainstream attention.0 5
Note that this approach diminishes but does not eliminate
race-consciousness in voting rights policy. Racial voting patterns must still be examined to determine where a cumulative
voting remedy is required, how the district must be drawn, and
what minimum number of seats the legislative body must have
for the aggregate of minority votes to exert some control. Not
surprisingly, Guinier's cumulative voting proposals draw fire
from the same critics who attack safe districting, again on the
grounds that such "antidemocratic" remedies represent interven-
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This works somewhat like the technique of "bullet voting" described in

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 38 n.5 (1986). In bullet voting, a voter
entitled to vote for five candidates might vote for just one in order to avoid
diluting support for the one desired candidate. By contrast, cumulative voting
permits the constructive use of these "extra" votes. Cf. Alexander Athan
Yanos, Note, Reconciling The Right To Vote With The Voting Rights Act, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1810 (1992) (arguing for system of "single transferable votes"
that would dispense with districting).
303 See Reuben, supra note 14, at 41 (remarks of Professor Guinier).
'° In Chilton County, Alabama, a voting rights challenge to election
procedures for the seven-member county commission was settled by adoption
of a cumulative voting scheme, thereby benefiting both African-Americans and
Republicans; both groups had been unable to obtain representation on the
commission. See Lani Guinier, supra note 289, at 55, 64. But see Cane v.
Worcester County, 35 F.3d 921 (4th Cir. 1994) (abuse of discretion for trial
court to preemptively order unwilling county to implement cumulative voting
remedy).
...See Peter Applebome, Guinier Ideas, Once Seen as Odd, Now Get
Serious Study, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1994, at E5 (illustrating how cumulative
voting scheme might hypothetically apply to North Carolina).
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racial minorities achieve different political outtion to30help
6
comes.
The legitimacy of current electoral strategies should be
evaluated for reasons beyond immediate remedial needs. If
James Madison was correct, factional domination on diverse
grounds will always endanger the vitality of political dialogue.
Establishing meaningful standards of judicial review, avoiding
flawed measures such as the shape test, placing colorblindness
in perspective, and exploring alternatives to safe districting will
invigorate reform and invest in the future of democracy.
CONCLUSION
District shape is a misleading and inadequate criterion on
which to gamble judicial review of districting legislation. The
fundamental right to vote cannot tolerate dilution by aesthetics
and formalisms. The shape test, through reasoning from mere
appearances to strict scrutiny, establishes an unstable standard
for judicial review in this sensitive area and promotes a colorblind theory of equal protection in disregard of the contemporary and color-conscious problem of minority vote dilution.
The Shaw Court erred because it relied all too faithfully on
formal race analysis. While optimistically calling for colorblind
and traditional districting principles, the Court failed to protect
the fundamental right of minorities to vote free of racial discrimination. As the Court itself has often stated, the essential
democratic right, the right that guarantees all rights, is the
right to vote. When the confrontation between colorblindness
and the Voting Rights Act reaches its denouement, it is this
right that must prevail.
Andrew W. Douglasst
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For example, George Will suggested that Professor Guinier "believes

blacks should have special rights" and, "believing that results are more
important than rules, would dilute democracy in order to promote 'progressive'
social outcomes." George Will, Sympathy for Guinier, NEWSWEEK, June 14,

1993, at 78. See also Clint Bolick, Clinton's Quota Queens, WALL ST. J., April
30, 1993, at A12 (mistakenly arguing Guinier believes in using quotas to force
racially proportional electoral outcomes).

t Candidate for J.D. 1995, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1989, Harvard
College. The author thanks Professor Kathryn Abrams, Professor Gary
Simson, and Tom Redburn for their advice on earlier drafts, and Whitney
Watts for her insight and encouragement throughout the writing process.

